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INCOMPLETE MARKETS
1. Introduction
The principal objective of general equilibrium theory is to study the al-
location of resources achievable via a system of markets. If all activity in an
economy could be viewed as taking place in a single period then it would per-
haps be reasonable to assume that markets are complete - that is, there is a
market and an associated price for each good. This is the environment of the
classical theory of resource allocation which finds its most elegant synthesis in
the Arrow-Debreu theory (Debreu (1959)). As soon as we are concerned with
a world in which time and uncertainty enter in an essential way it is no longer
reasonable to assume the existence of such a complete set of markets: we must
enter the world of incomplete markets. The object of this chapter is to lay
out briefly the principal contributions that have been made to this branch of
general equilibrium theory since the survey article of Radner (19S2).
The basic objective of the theory of incomplete markets is to extend the
general equilibrium analysis of markets from the classical Arrow-Debreu frame-
work (GE) to a more general model with real and financial markets in which
the structure of the markets is incomplete (GEI). The idea is to retain the sim-
plicity, coherence and generality which are the hallmarks of the Arrow-Debreu
construction while moving the nature of actual markets, contracts and con-
straints on agent participation into closer conformity with the actual structure
of markets observed in the real world. Thus in addition to the traditional real
spot markets for goods, there is a rich array of financial markets such as bond
and equity markets, not to speak of options, futures and insurance contracts,
as well as contracts between firms, between employees and firms and so on. To
model all these markets and contracts in a way that enhances our understanding
of the roles they play in the overall problem of arriving at an actual allocation
of resources over time is a challenging task on which significant progress has re-
cently been made. Far more of course remains to be understood. But we are not
alone in the profession in our conviction that a microeconomic foundation for
macroeconomics may ultimately come from a more concrete version of general
equilibrium theory in which there is trading on real and financial markets, where
nominal contracts and money enter in an essential way, but where the ability
to trade into the future is limited by the incompleteness of markets and by the
unwillingness or inability of agents to make more than limited committments
into the future (see Keynes (1936), Arrow (1974), Tobin (1980)).
Much of economic theory can be viewed as a study of the causes and conse-
quences of market failure, with special emphasis on the consequences of market
failure for subgroups of agents or for society as a whole. In such an inves-
tigation the Arrow-Debreu theory provides the idealised framework in which
markets function at their best. The phenomenon of incomplete markets taken
in its broadest sense includes the classical concept of missing markets arising
from externalities and public goods. However for the purposes of this survey
we interpret the theory of incomplete markets in the narrower sense of being
that branch of economic theory which studies the causes and consequences of
incomplete financial markets in a general equilibrium framework of risk and un-
certainty over time. The general equilibrium model that forms the basis for the
analysis satisfies all the idealised assumptions of the standard Arrow-Debreu
model except that it has incomplete markets. While the model is thus unrealis-
tic in that it retains the remaining idealised assumptions, it provides a setting
in which the effects of this particular market failure can be isolated and studied.
Classical general equilibrium theory (GE) as synthesised by Arrow-Debreu
has the property of being theoretically the most elegant and yet empirically
one of the least satisfactory parts of the economic theory. It is elegant, be-
cause within the context of a precisely formulated set of hypotheses it leads to
a clear and simple explanation of how an idealised system of markets allocates
resources and achieves what amounts to a best possible solution to the problem
of resource allocation. GE crystalises a classical tradition in economic theory
that has its origin in Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand, by which a
competitive system with market prices co-ordinates the otherwise independent
acitivities of consumers and producers acting purely in their self-interest. A
central conclusion is the idea of laisser-faire: the government should not inter-
fere with the system of markets that allocates resources in the private sector of
the economy.
GE however stands on shaky empirical foundations: one of its key hypothe-
ses is far from being satisfied. We live in a world in which time and uncertainty
enter in an essential way and in which the system of markets is incomplete.
What is needed is an extension of classical GE which explicity allows for the
fact that markets are incomplete and it is to this issue that the analysis that
follows addresses itself. We begin by recalling the market structure of GE —
the system of contingent markets. We then introduce the more general market
structure of GEI consisting of a system of spot markets for real goods coupled
with a system of financial markets.
Most of the theory is very recent, having its origins in the classical papers of
Arrow (1953), Diamond (1967), Radner (1972), Dreze (1974) and Hart (1975).
An extensive array of new results has been obtained in the last five years which
seems to call for a re-examination of the status of the theory. What are the
central issues which emerge? In this survey we focus principally on the conse-
quences as opposed to the causes of incomplete markets: from this perspective
three basic messages stand out.
(1) The non- neutrality of financial instruments and the role of money
(2) The conflicting objectives of firms
(3) The potential inadequacy of a decentralised system of markets
These three topics motivate the basic layout of the paper. Thus in sections
2 and 3 which analyse the GEI model of an exchange economy we find that when
markets are incomplete changing the financial instruments, or when nominal as-
sets are present, changing the money supply leads to a change in the equilibrium
allocation: in short financial instruments and money are non-neutral. Section
2 also contains a systematic analysis of the concepts and mathematical tech-
niques needed for a proper understanding of the behaviour of GEI equilibria.
While real assets are inflation proof, nominal assets are not. The economic
consequence is the striking property exhibited by the GEI model with nominal
assets: indeterminacy if the model is left unchanged (section 3.1) and non-
neutrality of money if a role is introduced for money as a medium of exchange
(section 3.2).
Section 4 presents an analysis of the GEI model of a production econ-
omy: it is here that the theory still encounters great difficulties. When markets
are incomplete each firm faces a public goods problem with respect to its con-
stituency of shareholders (and employees) for which there is no evident solution.
We try to bring together the different theories under a common framework, but
cannot claim to have advanced the theory much beyond the contribution of
Grossman-Hart (1979).
When markets are incomplete it should hardly be surprising that equilib-
rium allocations are inefficient. What is interesting is to understand the cause
of the inefficiency: this is the subject of section 5. From a policy point of view
(i.e. should the government intervene or not) what is significant is the mag-
nitude of the distortions which the inefficiency theorems assert are generically
present at an equilibrium. While the analysis of section 5 indicates in principle
how estimates of these magnitudes could be made, to our knowledge no such
estimates have yet been made.
We have attempted to present a reasonably coherent view of the current
status of the theory of incomplete markets. In emphasising conceptual continu-
ity we have had to sacrifice a number of important ideas which are dealt with
in only a cursory way in section 6.
A clarifying comment is perhaps in order regarding the relation between
the concept of equilibrium which forms the basis for the analysis which follows
and that which is used in the related area of temporary equilibrium theory. In
a model in which time and uncertainty enter in an essential way, a concept of
market equilibrium involves two subordinate concepts: one regarding expecta-
tion formation and one regarding market clearing. Agents must form expecta-
tions about future prices in order to determine their market demand decisions:
these demand decisions are then used via market clearing to determine prices.
In a temporary equilibrium agents form expectations (ex ante) about future spot
prices which are not necessarily fulfilled (ex post): in addition, at a given date,
only the current spot markets are required to clear, no condition being imposed
on future spot markets. This framework provides a natural and powerful tool
for analysing the consequences of incorrect and hence changing price expecta-
tions: it has been the subject of an extensive literature which is surveyed in
Grandmont (1982, 1988). However when financial markets enter in an essential
way (that is when arbitrage and information are important) a richer theory can
be developed if the much stronger assumption regarding expectation formation is
made that agents correctly anticipate furture prices and all future markets are
also cleared. This leads to the concept which Radner (1972, 19S2) has called
an equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations which forms the basis for
the analysis that follows. It should be noted that this concept permits agents
to hold different probability assessments regarding future events. In the special
case where all agents hold common probability assessments this concept reduces
to what is referred to in macroeconomics as a rational expectations equilibrium.
2. Real Assets
2.1 Two Period Exchange Economy
In this section we introduce the basic exchange economy and the concepts
of a GE and a GEI equilibrium. The model which underlies the first part of our
analysis is the simplest two period exchange economy under uncertainty. The
economy consists of a finite number of agents (i = 1, ...,/) and a finite number
of goods (£ = 1,...,L). To capture both time and uncertainty in the simplest
way we consider a model with two time periods (t = 0,1) in which one of S
states of nature (s = 1, ..,,£) occurs at date 1. For convenience we call date
t = 0, state s = so that in total there are 5 + 1 states. The main results that
follow can be extended to a stochastic process over many time periods (section
2.3 below).
Since there are L commodities available in each state (5 = 0, ...,S) the
commodity space is Kn with n = L(S + 1). Each consumer i (i = 1, ...,/)
has an initial endowment of the L goods in each state, u* = (wq,w\, ...,w's ).
Since consumer i does not know which state of nature will occur at date 1, the
endowment at date 1 u\ = (w\
,
...,w
l
s ) is a random variable. For concreteness
we can think of agent t's endowment w*
€
Ra as giving the output at dates
and 1 of a farm owned by agent i. The preference ordering of agent i is
represented by a utility function
u« : Ul —>R i = l I
defined over consumption bundles x* = (xq,x\,...,x 1s ) lying in his two-period
consumption set X 1 = R+. A useful example of a utility function is given by
the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function
s
3= 1
s
where p 3 > denotes the probability of state 5 and £3 Pa — !• But the results
3=1
that follow in no way depend on such a special form.
Since most of the mathematical proofs that follow are based on the use of
differential topology (see Guillemin and Pollack (1974)) we invoke the classical
smooth preferences introduced by Debreu (1972). The characteristics of agent
i are thus summarised by a utility function and endowment vector (u\u> x )
satisfying:
Assumption 1. (Agent characteristics) (1) u 1 : R" —> R is continuous
on fftf and C2 on R£+ (2) if U'(0 = {x 6 R+ | u'(x) > u«'(0} then
tf«'(0 C RJ+ , V f G R++ (3) For each x G RJ+1 Du''(i) G R++ and
hTD 2 u x {x)h < for all h ^ such that Du x\x)h = (4) to' G R++ .
Let (u,u>) = (u 1
,
...jU^jCJ 1
,
...jCJ7 ). The collection of i" agents with their
characteristics (u,u;) constitutes the smooth exchange economy £(u,lj) which
forms the basis for our initial analysis.
An allocation of resources for the economy £(u,u) is a vector of consump-
tion bundles x = (x 1 ,...,! 1 ) G R+ . Equilibrium theory can be viewed as the
qualitative study of the allocations that arise when we adjoin different market
structures to the basic exchange economy £(u,u). We will study two such mar-
ket structures: first a system of contingent markets and second a system of spot
and financial markets. The former leads to the standard general equilibrium
model (GE) of Arrow-Debreu, the latter to the general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets (GEI). For the exchange economy E(u,uj) the difference
between these two models reflects itself in the different budget sets that agents
face in these two market environments.
Contingent Markets (GE). A contingent commodity for good I (C =
1, ... L) in state 5 (s = 0, . .
.
, S) is a contract which promises to deliver one unit
of good C in state s and nothing otherwise. The price of this contract P3 t (mea-
sured in the unit of account) is payable at date 0. If there is available at date
a complete set of such contingent contracts (one for each good in each state)
then each agent i can sell his endowment a/' = (u?oi w !»-- • > ws) at ^e P r ices
P = (P , Pi, • • •
»
Ps) where P3 = (Ps i , .. . ,P*l), to obtain the income Pu { =
Yj 3=o Pau s and can purchase any consumption vector x
%
= (xj,, x\
,
. .
.
,
x's ) sat-
isfying Px l = Y^ 3=o Psx \ ^ Pu*. Agent z's contingent market (GE) budget set
is thus defined by
b{p,u { ) = {x- e r;
i
p(x'' -«') = 0}
Definition 1. A contingent market (CM) equilibrium for the economy £(u, w)
is a pair of actions and prices (x, P) = (x 1 , ..., x , P) such that
(i) x', t = !,...,/ satisfy i 1 = arg max u'(i')
x
{ eB{P,u l )
I
(n) ;>>•'- u/) = o
i=l
We also refer to such an equilibrium as a GE equilibrium.
Spot-Financial Markets (GEI). A system of contingent markets is a mar-
ket structure that is principally of theoretical interest: it can be viewed as an
ideal system of markets. It is far removed however from the sequential structure
of markets that is typical of actual decentralised market economies. To model
such a sequential structure we introduce a collection of real spot markets for
each of the L goods at date and in each state s at date 1, together with
a system of financial markets. The spot markets lead to a system of S
-f 1
budget constraints; the financial markets provide instruments that enable each
agent, at least to some extent, to redistribute income across the states, thereby
reducing the constraints imposed by the basic spot market equations. More
precisely, let p = (po,p\, .-,ps) 6 1TI++ denote the vector of spot prices, where
p» = (psi, ••iPsl) and p 3 ( denotes the price (measured in units of account)
payable in state s for one unit of good I. The essential distinction between a
spot market in state s and a contingent market for state s is that in the former
the payment is made at date 1 in state 5 (if ^j > 1), while in the latter it is always
made at date 0. It is this property that loads to the system of S
-I- 1 budget
constraints under a system of spot markets and to a single budget constraint
with a system of contingent markets.
The financial assets we consider will be one of three basic types or a com-
bination of these three: real assets (such as the equity of firms or futures con-
tracts on real goods), nominal assets (such as bonds or financial futures), and
secondary or derivative assets (such as call and put options). In each case we
assume that there is given a system of J financial assets where asset j can be
purchased for the price qj (units of account) at date and delivers a random
return V 3 = (V/,..., Vy) across the states at date 1 where the transpose T
indicates that V 3 is written as a column vector and where VJ is measured in
the unit of account. The J column vectors V3 can be combined to form the
date 1 matrix of returns
V = [V 1 . . . V J ] =
^l
1
L^J
vi
vi>
(i)
V generates the subs-pace of income transfers (V), namely the subspace of R
spanned by the J columns of V
(V) = {t £ R5
I
3 z E Rysuch that r = V z] (2)
Definition 2. If the subspace of income transfers satisfies (V) = R then
the asset structure is called complete. If (V) j= R then it is incomplete.
Let z x = (zJ,...,Zj) 6 R denote the number of units of each of the J
assets purchased by agent i (where z x- < means short-selling asset j), then the
5 + 1 budget constraints can be written as
pQ (x'Q -Uq) = -qz %
pa (x\ - u[) = V3 z\ s = 1,...,5
(3)
where q = (<?i , ...,<7./) and V3 = (VJ1 ,..., V~) is row 5 of the matrix V. If we
define the full matrix of returns (i.e. date and date 1)
W(q,V) =
V
-QJ
y,
J
V J
(4)
and for p G RL(5+1) , x i E RL(S+1) define the box product
p a x
%
=(pox % ,p 1 x\,...,psx ,s )
then agent t's GEI budget set is given by
„, ix f ,- „„ 3 z
i
€
RJ such that \
fi(p, ,;«') = |x 6 R+ p Q (iI- _ wi) = w{qV)zi | (5)
Definition 3. A spot-financial market (FM) equilibrium for the economy
£(u,u) is a pair of actions and prices ((x,z),(p, g)) = ((x 1 ,...,!^,^ 1 ,...,^7 ),^, q))
such that
(i) (x',2'), i = 1,..., J satisfy
x* = arg max "'(x 1 ) and p (x* — u;') = Wz*
x* 6 B(p,q;uj')
(ii) £(** -.«'*) «0 (iii) £ i* =
We also refer to such an equilibrium as a (7£7" equilibrium.
Real Assets. The first class of financial assets that we want to analyse is
the class of real assets. A real asset j is a contract which promises to deliver a
vector of the L goods (written as a column vector)
4 = (A* 1 ,...,^)r €RL , s = l,...,S
in each state 5 = 1, ...,S at date 1. A real asset is thus characterised by a date
1 commodity vector A7 = (A\, . .
.
, A3S )
T £ R (written as a column vector).
The revenue it yields in state 5 is proportional to the spot price p s
VJ = pa .Ai 5 = 1,...,S
If there are J real assets then the date 1 matrix of returns (1) is given by
Pl A\ ... piAJ-1
V = V(Pl ) =
-PSA);
9
• PsA Js
where p\ = (pi,...,ps) £ R is the date 1 vector of spot prices. If (for
emphasis) we let ps — denote the row vector (p,i,. . . jPsl) then we can also
write V as
V(pi) =
Pi
p?
PS
r Al
A\
A ls
J-,M
A{
Ail
Real assets are inflation-proof in the sense that doubling the spot prices
in state 5 doubles their income. Thus with real assets if (p~o,p"i, ...,p~s,?) is
an equilibrium price vector then (aop~o> a iPi» ...,QsPS)Qo?) with a s > 0, 5 =
0,...,S is also an equilibrium price vector. In short, in an economy with only
real assets price levels are unimportant.
If we let the J column vectors A 3 £ R , J = 1,
LS x J matrix
A 1
, J, be the colums of an
A=[A 1 ...AJ
]
=
A J 1
4 1 >4 J
then the real asset structure is summarised by the matrix A G (R ) . We let
£{u,u)\ A) denote the exchange economy with real asset structure .4.
Example 1. (contingent commodities)
Introduce J = SL assets, one for each good in each state. Asset j = (5, £), 5 =
1, ..., S, I = 1, ..., L promises to deliver one unit of good £ in state s and nothing
otherwise. Thus A^'j = 1 and A' h^ = if (a,h) ^ (s,i). Here A = ISL (the
SL x SL identity matrix) and
V =
Pi
P7
Ps
Thus (V) = R . Since z x 6 R , commodities are purchased forward directly
and there is no need to exchange on spot markets at date 1. It is clear that
it suffices to consider the subset of assets which delivers only the first good in
each state: this leads to the next example.
10
Example 2. (numeraire assets)
Suppose each asset j delivers contingent amounts of only one of the goods, say
the first. In this case A{ = (A}3l ,0, .. . ,0)r and V can be written as
V(pi) =
Pn
P21
1
Psi-I
r A 1
A 1/i21
A J
A J
A\s\ A
J
si
Note that in general i.e. for most S x J matrices (A{), changing the prices
p s i(s = 1, . . . , S) changes the subspace (V) spanned by the columns of V but
leaves the dimension of the subspace (V) unchanged (i.e. dim(V) = J for all
p 3 i > 0, s = 1, . . . S). However since with real assets price levels do not matter
it is often convenient to normalise the spot prices so that p3 \ = 1 (s = 0, . . . , S).
In this case the matrix V becomes
V =
A 1
.4 si
A J
aJ
'H S1
so that the subspace (V) is independent of p\. For most real asset structures not
only does the subspace (V{p\)) vary as pi changes, but also the dimension of
(V(p 1 )) can change as p x changes and this creates some quite new phenomena.
In this sense the next two examples are more representative of the general class
of real asset structures.
Example 3. (futures contracts)
Suppose there are J < L futures contracts on the goods. If the j
th
asset is a
futures contract for good j then A }
s
- = 1, A }st = 0, I ^ j, s = 1,...,5, j =
1, ..., J. In this case
Pn ••• P\J
V = : :
psi ••• ps J
Note that if the spot prices p 3 are all collinear (p 3 = a s p for a 3 > 0, p £
R.++ , s = 1,...,5) then (V) is a one-dimensional subspace: with no price
variability across the states no spanning is achieved with futures contracts.
11
Example 4. (equity contracts)
Consider the simplest production economy in which agents hold initial owner-
ship shares of firms. Let there be J firms and suppose the production decision
y' E Y J (firm j's production set) has already been made where Y3 C Hn : then
the equity offirm j is a real asset with AJ9 = y Js , s = 1,...,S. Let 8
%
= (#j, ...,#|/)
denote the portfolio of shares purchased by agent i and let £' = (Ci>--->0) de-
note his initial ownership shares, with Q > and ^ l=1 Cj = 1, J == 1, •••, </• We
assume that if agent i buys the share 6 %- of firm j then he also finances the share
#'(—PoVo) °f tne input cost at date 0. A stock market equilibrium is then defined
in the obvious way. In a stock market equilibrium the assets (equities) are in
positive net supply: the change of variable z l = 6* — £', a;' = u* + y£' where
y = li/
1
..-!/ ] converts the stockmarket equilibrium into an FM equilibrium in
which assets are in zero net supply. In this case the returns matrix W in (4) is
given by
W =
-?i+PoyJ ••• -qj + Poyo
PiVi ••• PiV\
psvs • psyi
j -.
Clearly examples 3 and 4 can be combined to create an asset structure consisting
of a system of futures contracts and equity.
No-arbitrage equilibrium. The idea of arbitrage and the absence of arbi-
trage opportunities is a basic concept of finance. Applied in an abstract way in
the present model, it leads to an alternative (and equivalent) concept of equilib-
rium that is analytically simpler to work with than an FM equilibrium. Let us
show how this new concept of equilibrium is derived. We say that { 6 R is
a no-arbitrage asset price if there does not exist a portfolio z 6 1R such that
W(q, V)z > (where for y 6 RS+1 , y>0 means ya >0, 3 = 0,...,S and y a >
for at least one s). Agent Vs utility maximising problem in Definition 3(i) has
a solution if and only if q is a no-arbitrage asset price. Recall the following
version of the Minkowski-Farkas lemma (see Gale (1960, p.49)).
12
Lemma 1. If W is an (S+l) x 7 matrix then either there exists z 6 R
such that Wz > or there exists (3 £ Rf
+
1
such that (3W = 0.
Thus the absence of arbitrage opportunities in the trading of the financial
assets implies the existence of a present value vector (positive state prices) =
(j8o,|3i,...,j3s) such that 0W = which is equivalent to p qj = J23=i fisVjiJ —
1,..., J so that the -price of each asset equals the present value of its future
income stream. From the budget equations (3), the date equation becomes
S 5
/? po(*o - wj) = -/W = -^AV.z 1' = -£/Wxj -wj) (6)
«=i j=i
If we define the new vector of date present value prices
P = /3 Up
Then the date budget equation (6) reduces to the GE budget constraint
(7)
P(x i - J) =
In the case of real assets since the date 1 equations are homogeneous functions
of the spot prices, the date 1 equations can be written as
A a(*i-«i)€(V(/\))
where Pi = (Pi , . .
.
, Ps) is the vector of present value prices for date 1. Thus
under the new vector of prices (7) each agent can be viewed as maximising
utility over the budget set
B(P;u/)= { x'<ERJ (8)
P{x { - w«) =
Px (*i-<4)eG'(Pi)>J
It is clear that the budget set (8) is the same for all those (3 and /?' such that
It thus suffices to choose one no-arbitrage /?. In particular since the first or-
der conditions for maximising utility stibject to the constraints (3) lead to a
13
vector of marginal utilities of income (Lagrange multipliers) A' = (A^A^) =
(Aq, Aj, ..., A^) for agent i which satisfies
we may choose = A 1 . It is easy to check that with this choice of (3 agent
l's budget set reduces to a GE budget set (i.e. the date 1 constraints are
automatically satisfied).
For reasons that will become clear shortly we need to consider equilibria
in which the subspace of income transfers (V) is of fixed dimension p, where
<-p < S. Let G P(R ) denote the set consisting of all linear subs-paces of
Hi of dimension p. Let L 6 GP(H ) denote a p-dimensional subspace of
R . Replacing the actual subspace of income transfers (V(P1 )) by a surrogate
subspace L, the budget set (8) becomes
B(P,L;u i)={ x'eR;
P(x' -w'') =
Pi n(x[ -u[)eL
We are thus led to the following alternative concept of equilibrium.
(9)
Definition 4. A normalised no-arbitrage (NA) equilibrium of rank p with
< p < S for the economy £(u,u] A) is a pair (x, P, L) € R+7 x R++ x G P(R
S
)
such that
(i) x 1 = argmaxu^i 1 ), x % = arg max u'(x'), i = 2, ...,/
x
1 eB^w 1 ) x 1' GB^.Liu 1')
'
(ii) ]T(x'-u;') = (iii) (V(P1 ))=L
i'=i
Remark. Normalising the no-arbitrage equilibrium by choosing the no-arbi-
trage present value vector /? = A 1 has two important consequences. First it gives
a GE demand function for agent 1 satisfying the standard boundary condition.
Second it eliminates a condition of dependence for the aggregate demands at
date 1(5 date 1 Walras Law equations) that would otherwise arise from the
fact that each agent satisfies Pi (x\ — oj[) E L. This allows transversality
14
arguments to be applied directly. The following lemma shows that the concepts
of an FM equilibrium of rank p that is, with rank V(r\) = p, and an NA
equilibrium of rank p are equivalent. NA equilibria are analytically easier to
handle.
Lemma 2. (i) If ((x, z), (p, q)) is an FM equilibrium of rank p then there
exists a p- dimensional subspace L G GP(RS ) and a no-arbitrage /? E R++l
such that (z,/? p, L) is an NA equilibrium of rank p.
(ii) If(x, P, L) is an NA equilibrium of rank p then there exist portfolios z =
(z 1 ,...,^1 ) and an asset price q such that ((x,z),(.P,g)) is an FM equilibrium
of rank p.
Dual Subspaces. Define the subspace of income transfers in R " generated
by the columns of the matrix W
(W) = {r£ Rs+1
I
3 z e R/ such that r = Wz]
and the orthogonal (dual) subspace of present value vectors (state prices)
(W)-1- = {(3e Rs+1
I
(3W = 0}
Each agent i 's income transfer vector r l = Wz* arising from asset trading lies
in (W) and his (normalised) present value vector it 1 = ( j-J A', arising from
the portfolio first order conditions, lies in {W) . A key idea that underlies the
analysis of incomplete markets can now be given a precise geometric statement.
Since R = (TV) © (W") the greater (smaller) the dimension of the space
of income transfers the smaller (greater) the space of present value vectors. In
short the greater the opportunities for income transfer, the smaller the differ-
ences of opinion among agents about the present value of a stream of date 1
income. We say that W is a no-arbitrage matrix if (W) f) (Rf+1 \0) = ^ .
Lemma 1 can then be stated as
either (W) f] (Rj+1 \0) £ <f> or (IV) X D R^ 1 ^ j>
Thus if W is a no-arbitrage matrix then dim (W)"1" > 1. In the case of com-
plete markets dim ( W ) = S and dim ( W ) ± = 1 so that there is a unique
normalised vector tx 6 R++ 1 (with 7r = 1) satisfying ttW = 0. With complete
markets all agents present value vectors coincide r 1 = ... = n { = 77: there
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is complete agreement about the present value of a stream of date 1 income.
This property leads to the Pareto optimality of a GEI equilibrium when asset
markets are complete. When the markets are incomplete, if dim (W) = J < S
then dim (W)"1" = 5 — J + l > 1. We will show that generically in an as-
sociated GEI equilibrium, agents normalised present value vectors are distinct.
With incomplete asset markets there is disagreement about the present value of
a stream of date 1 income. It is this difference in the n* vectors which leads to
the Pareto-inefficiency of a GEI equilibrium when asset markets are incomplete.
More generally it is the differences in the ir* vectors that drive the key results
in the theory of incomplete markets.
Existence of GEI equilibrium. From the classical GE existence theorem
we know that for all characteristics (u,u>) satisfying Assumption 1 the exchange
economy £(u,u>) has a contingent market (CM) equilibrium (Debreu (1959)).
Does a GEI equilibrium exist for all such economies? Not necessarily, as Hart
(1975) first showed. The key intuition behind Hart's nonexistence example can
be illustrated as follows.
Example 5. (Nonexistence of a GEI equilibrium)
Suppose the only activity at date is the trading of financial assets. We consider
an economy with two agents, two commodities and two states of nature (I =
L = S = 2). The utility functions, endowments and asset structure of the
economy £(u,u>; A) are as follows:
utility functions:
3=1
tf
,
'(0«ajlog&+or51og6
I
a 1 = (a{ , a£)
,
a'( > , a\ + q{ = 1
endowments: for < e < 1
,
1 —
€ + /i > 0,
p a > , pi + P2 = 1
z = l,2 (a )
w =
™01 W \l
wQ2 w l2
IV 21
w22.
l-e+h
€
1 -e €
(b)
1G
w2 =
w01
L^
w 11 IV21
W 12 W22
e l-e
e l-e
real assets: futures contracts for goods 1 and 2:
A a =
1
1
5 = 1,2 so that V = Pn P12
P21 P22
(c)
Remark. For the economy with characteristics (u,u;; A) defined by (a) — (c)
a GEI equilibrium exists if and only if either h ^ or e = ^ or a\ = orj.
TTiti.? :/ /i = 0, e 7^ |, a{ ^ a| f/ien no C757 equilibrium exists.
In this economy there is aggregate risk if and only if /* ^ and individual
risk if and only if € ^ i. The condition a} ^ aj states that the two agents
have distinct preferences for the two goods. The assertion is thus that if there
is no aggregate risk (h = 0), if both agents face individual risk (e ^ |) and
if the agents have distinct preferences for the two goods (a\ ^ a\), then a
risk-sharing (GEI) equilibrium cannot be obtained through a system of futures
markets. Let us indicate briefly two ways of showing that no GEI equilibrium
exists. First three observations:
(1) If a\ ^ a \ then in a pure spot market equilibrium the spot prices are
linearly independent.
(2) If an GEI equilibrium satisfies rank V = 2, then a CM equilibrium can
be constructed with the same allocation and prices.
(3) If h = then in a CM equilibrium the prices in the two states are
collinear.
If a GEI equilibrium price (p, q) exists then either rank V = 1 or rank V = 2.
If rank V = 1, then the equilibrium must be a pure spot market equilibrium,
since nothing can be gained from asset trading. By (1) spot prices are linearly
independent, implying rank V = 2, a contradiction. If rank V = 2 then by
(2) a CM equilibrium can be constructed with identical prices, but by (3) the
prices are collinear, implying rank V = 1, a contradiction. Thus neither case
can arise and no GEI equilibrium exists when h = 0, e -^ r, a\ ^ a\.
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A second argument can be obtained by examining the properties of a GEI
equilibrium when h ^ 0. When h ^ then in a CM equilibrium the prices
in the two states are linearly independent: these equilibrium prices can be
calculated. When h — (i.e. as the aggregate risk goes to zero) the prices
become more and more collinear, so that the agents have to trade progressively
more to achieve a given transfer of income. In fact as h — 0, || z*{h) || — oo
so that in the limit no equilibrium exists.
There is a simple economic message that underlies this example. Futures
markets are not the appropriate markets for sharing individual risk when there
is no underlying aggregate risk. For in the absence of aggregate risk, spot prices
are not sufficiently variable across the states to permit the proper functioning
of a system of futures markets.
References. The basic two period exchange economy of this section together
with the concepts of a CM and an FM equilibrium (in the case where the assets
are the nominal assets called Arrow securities) was first introduced in the classic
paper of Arrow (1953). While Diamond (1967) was the first to explicitly model
incomplete markets, the first fully articulated general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets is that of Radner (1972): he established existence of an
equilibrium by placing a priori bounds on the agents' trades in asset markets.
Hart (1975) subsequently developed a more convenient model by introducing
the class of real assets: this led to his famous examples of nonexistence and
ranking of equilibria. The concept of no-arbitrage and the associated existence
of prices is as old as economics and finance. Perhaps the earliest mathemat-
ical formalisation appears in the activity analysis literature of the 1950's (see
Koopmans (1951)). If the columns of W denote activities then the choice of
a portfolio is equivalent to the choice of an activity vector. The absence of
arbitrage is equivalent to the requirement that it is not possible to produce any
good in positive amount without using some other good as an input — a con-
dition that Koopmans (1951) called the impossibility of the land of Cockaigne
— this is shown to imply the existence of positive prices for the commodities.
The idea of a no-arbitrage equilibrium appears in Fischer (1972) and is made
into a basic tool of analysis in Cass (19S5) and Magill-Shafer (19S5).
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2.2A Generically Complete Markets
In this section we shall develop some basic techniques for handling the GEI
model and show how these techniques can be used to establish the conditions
under which the GEI and GE equlibrium allocations coincide. These techniques
will play a basic role in all the analysis that follows.
Consider the exchange economy £(u,uj; A) with financial structure A. Let
us fix the profile of utility functions u = (u 1 ,...,^ ) with each u* satisfying
Assumption 1 and the asset structure A
€
R . If we let the vector of endow-
ments u = (cj 1
,
....uj 1 ) lie in the open set
ft = r;'+
(called the endowment space) then we obtain a parametrised family of economies
{£a(u>), uj € ft}. We say that a property holds generically if it is true on an
open set of full measure in the parameter space ft.
Definition 5. Let Ea{uj) denote the set of financial market (FM) equilib-
rium allocations (i.e. the vector of consumption bundles x = (x 1 ,...,! 1 ) for
each FM equilibrium) for the economy £a(uj). Similarily let Ec(u) denote the
set of contingent market (CM) equilibrium allocations for the parameter value
UJ.
The most natural way to begin an analysis of the properties of the set
(correspondence) Ea(uj) is to try to relate them to the properties of the set
(correspondence) Ec(v), which are well-known. From the classical GE theory
we have the following three properties
PI. Existence: Ec{u) ^ fi for all u G ft.
P2. Pareto optimality: x £ Ec{w) => x is Pareto optimal, for all u £ ft.
P3. Comparative statics: generically Eq(u) is a finite set and each equi-
librium is locally a smooth function of the parameter uj.
The problem of studying the relation between sets Ea(uj) and Ec{uj) can be
posed as the solution of the following
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CHARACTERISATION PROBLEM:
(a) What condition on the real asset structure A 6 JR ensures that there
exist generic sets ft', ft" such that
(1) Ec (e>) C EA {u>) for all u; € ft'
(2) EA {u) C Ec(w) for all u € ft"
(b) If there exists a generic set ft* such that
Ec (uj) = EA {u) for all w € ft*
iy/ia2 restriction does this imply on the real asset structure A?
The theorems of this section give the solution to the characterisation problem
obtained by Magill-Shafer (1985). We begin with the key condition on the asset
structure .4.
Definition 6. The real asset structure A
€
H is regular if for each
state of nature 5 = 1,...,5, a row a s can be selected from the L x J matrix
A 3 = [A\ . . . .4/] such that the collection (a 3 )f=1 is linearly independent. Note
that this requires J > S.
Example 6. The asset structure with J = L = S futures contracts
AM =
1
1
= /£,, s = l,...,S
is regular.
Theorem 1. If the real asset structure A G R is regular then there
exists a generic set ft' C ft such that
Ec(oj)CEa (u) VwGft'
Proof. The basic idea is simple.
(1) We first establish the following property: if the asset structure A is
regular then the set of critical date 1 prices
A'i = {pi eULS | rankF(Pl )<S}
r o* T
is a closed set of measure zero in It . Define A* = II x 7v\
.
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(2) It follows from lemma 2(ii) that if (x, P) is a CM equilibrium for which
rank V(Pi) = S, where P = (Po,Pi) then there exist portfolios and
prices p = P, q = 5Z3=1 ^(pi) such that ((x, z), (p, g)) is an FM equi-
librium.
(3) If we can show that there is a generic set Q' such that for all economies
ui 6 ft', the CM equilibrium prices do not end up in the critical set
K
,
then the proof will be complete. To show this we use the following
property: Let U C Hlm and let <f> : U — Hln , m > n be a submersion
(i.e. Dz <f> : U — Rn is surjective for all x G U). If K C Rn is a
closed set of measure zero then $~ 1 (K) is a closed set of measure zero
in Rm .
The natural tool for completing step (3) is the theory of regular economies
introduced by Debreu (1970); the basic ideas are explained in the article of
Dierker (1982). Let the function F : R++ x RJ+ —> R
n defined by
/
F(P,o; 1 ,...,a; ; ) = ^(/ i (P,P.u,')-u;')
i=l
denote the GE aggregate excess demand function and let F = (F\,...,Fn -\)
denote the truncation of F defined on the normalised price domain V = {P 6
R+ + I Pn = 1}. An economy u 6 Q, is regular if rank (DpF(P,u)) = n — 1 for
all equilibrium prices i.e. P satisfying F(P,u) = 0. It is shown that the set of
regular economies Qr is an open set of full measure in Q. Pick u) G Qr then by
the Implicit Function Theorem there exists a neighborhood Ucj of d> and smooth
functions xp 3 : U& — V, j = l,...,r defining the equilibrium prices, so that
F{ipi(u),uj) = for all u 6 Uq, j = l,...,r. Thus D„il>> = -{DPF)- l Du F,
where (DpF)~ l is well-defined and of rank n — 1 since u is a regular economy.
Since rank (DUF) = n - 1 it follows that rank Du ipi = n - 1 for all u G U&,
so that xj) 3 is a submersion. Applying the property given above(i/> Jr )
-1 (A'), j =
1,—,r are closed sets of measure zero, so that U& — Ucj \ U'j=1 (tP } )~
1 (K) is
an open set of full measure in Uq. Repeating the argument over a countable
sequence of regular values leads to a sequence of open sets U[, U'2 , ... and Q' =
Ut=i U'k ls then the desired generic set for step (3). Q.E.D.
Remark. The key intuition behind step 3 lies in the fact that the price func-
tions ip J are locally onto: this implies that 4,J can be moved in any direction in
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V by a small perturbation in w, thereby ensuring that all the critical prices K
can be avoided.
Generic Existence. Using property PI of GE theory and theorem 1 gives
the following existence theorem for GEI equilibria.
TGI
Theorem 2. (Existence) If the real asset structure A6R is regular
then there exists a generic set fi'cU such that
EA (u>) ± j> Vw6n'
Remark. Property P2 of GE theory and theorem 1 imply that "whenever
u> £ Q' there is at least one allocation x G Ea (lj) which is Pareto optimal.
Can there be inefficient equilibria under the regularity condition? Hart (1975)
showed that this can occur. Let us modify the asset structure in Example 5
and show how this can happen.
Example 5. (continued) Replace the futures contracts by the following real
assets
Ai =
1
2
A2 =
2
1
It is easy to check that inserting the GE equilibrium prices leads to a V ma-
trix of rank 2. Thus the GE equilibrium allocation can be achieved as a FM
equilibrium. But it can be shown that there exist (a},aj,e) such that there
is in addition a pure spot market equilibrium (z = 0) and this equilibrium is
inefficient (in fact Pareto inferior to the full rank equilibria). Examples of this
kind are exceptional as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 3. If the real asset structure A
€
R is regular then there
exists a generic set Q" C H such that
Ea (uj) C Ec{u>) Vwefl"
Remark. The proofs of theorems 1 and 2 use known results of GE theory to
obtain a result for a GEI equilibrium. To prove theorem 3 we need a new tool
for handling the GEI model — a method for systematically handling equilibria
of all possible ranks p (0 < p < S) while avoiding the discontinuities created
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by changes in the rank of V. This can be done by using the concept of an NA
equilibrium of rank p (definition 5). With this new concept "market clearing"
involves not just the prices P, but also the new variable L, which consists of a
p- dimensional subspace of R .
We can write an NA equilibrium as the solution of a collection of conditions
on the new price variables (P, L) € RJ+ x GP{U
S
). Let f
l {P,u l ) denote the
standard GE demand function of agent 1 and define the NA demand, functions
of the remaining agents i = 2, ...,/
/'(P.Lju/) = arg max uHx 1 )
. . (10)
x
l eB(P,L;u l )
and the aggregate excess NA demand function
I
F(P,I;u; 1 ,...,u; / ) = /
1 (P,a; 1 )-u; 1 +^(/ :'(P,L;u;')-u;') . (11)
Then (P, L) 6 -K++ X G P(JR ) is an NA equilibrium of rank p if and only if
F(P,L;u) =
- - (12)(V(P;A))=L
where we have included the fact that V depends on the returns matrices A,
just as F depends on the parameters w, an observation that we shall not use
immediately, but which is important in section 2.2B below. (12) gives the
fundamental conditions characterising equilibria with incomplete markets.
Representation of Subspaces. Up till now the set G P(1R ) has been
viewed purely formally as the collection of all p-dimensional linear subspaces of
the Euclidean space R . To prove theorem 3 and to establish the existence of
equilibrium with incomplete markets (section 2.2B) we need an explicit way of
representing all p- dimensional subspaces in the neighborhood of a given subspace
L 6 Gp (JRs ).
Associated with any p-dimensional subspace L 6 Gp(Ii ) there is a unique
(S — p)-dimensional subspace L^, its orthogonal complement, consisting of all
vectors at right angles to L
L 1- = {v e Rs
I
v±L]
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i.e. their inner product with any vector from L is zero. Pick any collection of
linearly independent vectors Bj G R
, j = 1,...,5 — p such that {B\,...,Bs-p }
is a basis for the orthogonal space L . Let 5 be the (S — p) x S matrix whose
(S — p) rows are the vectors Bj] then L1- = ( BT ), where BT denotes the
transpose of B and
L = {v e R5 | Bv = 0} (13)
Thus L is represented as the solution of a system of equations using the co-
efficients of the matrix 56 E . But there are many ways of choosing
the basis B. In fact :/ B is a basis for L^ then so is CB for any non-singular
(5 — p) x (5 — p) matrix C. We need to factor out this redundancy in the
representation of L^. Note that since rank B = S — p we can always per-
form a permutation of the columns of £ (this amounts to permuting the states
s = 1, ...,5) in such a way that the permuted matrix B' = [Bi \ B2 ] where B\
is an (S — p) x (5 — p) matrix of rank S — p and j?2 is an (5 — /)) x p matrix. Let
C = Bf 1 then CB = [Bj- 1^ | Bf 1 ^] = [J | E] where / is the (S-p) x(S-p)
identity matrix and E is an (S — p) x p matrix. We now have a normalised way
of representing L (see figure 1)
L = {v <= R5 | [/ | E]v = 0} (14)
which involves (S — p) • p parameters (the matrix E) rather than the (S — p) • S
parameters (the matrix B) in the representation (13). It is now true that there
exists a neighborhood of L in GP(M ) such that for any L close to L there
exists a unique matrix E in Iv ~ p ' p such that L is represented via (14) with
E. Conversely with any E in Mc ~ p ' p we can associate a unique L 6 GP(M ).
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Figure 1. Representation of Subspace
Proof of Theorem 3. The idea of the proof is simple. We show that
there is a generic set Q" such that for all u; 6 Q," , every GEI equilibrium
satisfies dim( V(pi) ) = S. This is equivalent to proving that equilibria with
dim( V(pi) ) = p for < p < S cannot arise. By lemma 2 we know that
analysing GEI equilibria of rank p is equivalent to analysing NA equilibria
of rank p. We show that NA equilibria of rank p can be defined (locally) as
solutions of a system of equations in which the number of equations exceeds the
number of variables and in which the number of linearly independent equations
exceed the number of variables. Once this is established, the existence of the
desired generic set Ct" follows from a standard transversality argument.
(1) It can be shown that there exists a finite collection of manifolds Mfc, k =
l,...,r with dimMfc = SL-1 such that the h\ = {Px G RSL |rank V(P!)
where
(2)
< 5} satisfies K\ C Ujt=i ^k- Let V be partitioned as V =
VffispXj and let M'k = {P1 G Mk \ rank V>(Px) = p).
Using (14) we can write aggregate demand as a function of E so that
the local equations for an NA equilibrium of rank p become
F(P,E,u) =
G(P,E) =
(15)
where F = (F,,..., F„_, ) and G(P,E) = [/ | E] V(PX ). Thus (F,G) :
v x M'k x n
iS- p)p
x r;;+ - RL_1 x RSL x TiJ ^ s-^ where V =
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{Po 6 R£+ | Poi = 1}. Since rank (D„F) = L - 1 + SL and rank
(DeG) = />(S — p), the number of independent equations exceeds the
number of variables by 1. Q.E.D.
Using property P2 of GE equilibria or directly using the fact that rank V = S
implies x l = ... = it 1 gives the following:
Theorem 4. (Pareto Optimality) If the real asset structure A £ RLSJ is
regular then there exists a generic set Ct" C ^ such that x £ Ea{w) implies x
is Pareto optimal, for all u> 6 Q."
.
Combining theorems 1-4 and defining Ct* = 0.' C\ Q" shows that the regu-
larity condition ensures that generically GE and GEI market equilibrium allo-
cations coincide.
Theorem 5. (Equivalence under Regularity) If the asset structure A (E
JR. is regular then there exists a generic set H'Cfi such that
EA {u) = Ec(u) VwGfi*
Let Ar C II denote the set of regular asset structures. It is clear that Ar
is open: but beyond this it seems to be a complicated set. It is natural to ask
what happens to equilibrium allocations as we let A vary in the set Ar.
Theorem 6. (Invariance of Financial Structure) Let A £ Ar then there
exists a generic set Qa C 0. such that for lo £ Q^
Ea'(w) = Ea(u) for almost all A'
€ Ar .
Furthermore EA {u) = EA+dA(u) for all local changes dA £ RLSJ .
Remark. Theorem 6 reveals a remarkable invariance property: under the
regularity condition equilibrium allocations of the GEI model are invariant with
respect to changes in the return structure of the financial assets. We shall see
that when markets are incomplete theorem 6 fails dramatically, for then the
basic dichotomy that it reflects between the real and financial sectors of the
economy is no longer valid.
Theorem 5 combined with property P3 for GE equilibria (namely Debreu's
(1970) theorem) leads to the following result.
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Theorem 7. (Comparative Statics) If the asset structure A E K is
regular then generically Ea{uj) ^ <f> is a Unite set and each equilibrium is
locally a C 1 function of the parameter u.
We have shown that regularity is a sufficient condition for ensuring that
generically GE and GEI equilibrium allocations coincide: the next result shows
that regularity is also a necessary condition for this property to hold. We have
thereby obtained a complete solution to the characterisation problem posed at
the beginning of this section.
Theorem 8. (Necessity of Regularity) If there exists a generic set £l m such
that Ec{u) = Ea{u) for all u; E ft* then the asset structure A is regular.
References. The techniques and results of this section were obtained by
Magill-Shafer (1985). A special case of theorems 1 and 2 where A represents
futures contracts was obtained by Magill-Shafer (1984) and independently by
McManus (1984) and Repullo (1986). Magill-Shafer (1985) also extended these
results to the case of a stochastic exchange economy (section 2.3).
2.2B Incomplete Markets
In this section we will study the properties of the GEI model when the
markets are incomplete. The key technique for establishing the generic existence
of a GEI equilibrium is the global analysis of a slight weakening of the concept
of a no-arbitrage (NA) equilibrium which we call a pseudo-equilibrium. The
theorems of this section reveal the very different qualitative properties of the
set Ea(u) when asset markets are incomplete (J < 5).
In the previous section genericity was with respect to the space of endow-
ments Q = R++ . In this section the parameter space is augmented by adding
the space of (real) asset structures A = R . Thus genericity is with respect
to the parameters
{u,A) eft xA
To emphasise this choice of parameters we let E(u, A) = EA (u) denote the set
of GEI equilibrium allocations for the economy £(u, A) = SA (u;). In view of this
extended concept of genericity the theorems that follow are weaker than those
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presented in the previous section in the case where the markets are complete.
The first result asserts the generic existence of a GEI equilibrium and will be
proved later in this section.
Theorem 9. (Existence) Let £(u,u>; A) be a GEI exchange economy satis-
fying Assumption 1. If J < S then there exists a generic set A' C H x A such
that
E{u,A)^ $ , V(u 1A)eA'
The next theorem asserts that when markets are incomplete GEI equilib-
rium allocations are generically Pareto inefficient. A more thorough analysis of
the precise sense in which GEI equilibria are inefficient is postponed to section
5. The second property asserted by the theorem is that all agents have distinct
(normalised) present value vectors. As we shall see in section 4 this has par-
ticularly important consequences when we introduce firms that need to make
decisions (at date 0) on production plans at date 1. Agents will hold quite
different opinions on the present value of any such productions plans.
Theorem 10. (Pareto Inefficiency) If J < S then there exists a generic
set A" Cfixi such that x £ E(u>, A) implies x is Pareto inefficient, for all
(cj, A) E A". Furthermore the present value coefficients of the agents
jt''<=R5+1
,
1 = 1,...,/
are distinct for each x £ E(u, A), V (u>, A) £ A".
Proof. (Idea). It is the fact that dim {V) = J <=> dim (V) - S - J >
that allows agents (normalised) 7r' vectors to be distinct in equilibrium. This is
proved by adjoining the equations t:\ — -k\ — to the equations of equilibrium
and showing that the resulting system of equations involves more independent
equations than unknowns. Q.E.D.
Let A* = A' DA", then we have the following analogue of theorem 5 which
compares the GE and GEI equilibrium allocations.
Theorem 11. If J < S then there is a generic set A" C Q x A such that
£(u;,.4)n£c(u,)= jrf, V(u,.4)6A*
2S
The invariance theorem of the previous section asserted that when markets
are complete, changing the asset structure does not alter the equilibrium allo-
cations: in short, with complete markets financial changes have no real effects.
This property of invariance with respect to financial structure is no longer true
when markets are incomplete. In this case, changing the structure of financial
assets in general alters the equilibrium allocations: in short, when markets are
incomplete financial changes have real effects. Unlike theorem 6, the following
result is confined to a statement about the effects of local changes in the asset
structure.
Theorem 12. (Real Effects of Financial Assets) If J < S then there exists
a generic set A* C ft x A such that for all (u,A) € A*
E(u,A)nE{w,A + dA) = j>
(or almost all local changes dA G JR.
Proof of Theorem 12. (Idea) Consider an NA equilibrium of rank J with
price vector P. For generic dA, (V(P,A)) ^ (V(P,A + dA)) since J < S. Since
generically P-l a (x\ — u[) £ ( V(P, A + dA) ) for some i, P cannot remain an
equilibrium price vector. But any new equilibrium price P' ^ P must change
the demand of agent 1 and hence the equilibrium allocation. Q.E.D.
Example 7. Consider the following simple example: 7 = 2, L = 1, / = 1,
agents have identical log-linear utility functions logx + logxi + log £2, ar*d
endowments a; 1 = (1,2, e), u> 2 = (l,e, 2). The single asset delivers one unit of
the good in state 1 and 1 + 8 units in state 2. If < e < 2, it is not difficult
to verify that if 8 = 0, the unique equilibrium is the no trade equilibrium, and
that if 8 ^ is small, trade takes place in equilibrium. The 8^0 equilibrium
is Pareto superior to the 8 = equilibrium.
Theorem 12 and the above example make it clear that the nature of assets
has both private and social consequences, and that a fully general theory of
trade with financial assets needs to include a specification of the process by
which assets are designed and introduced into the economy. It is inappropriate
to suppose that the financial structure of an economy is independent of the
characteristics of the agents that constitute the economy. One particularly
interesting question is whether private incentives to offer assets are compatible
with social welfare criteria, when it is not possible to complete the markets.
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Proof of the Theorem 9. Recall the strategy of the proof with potentially
complete markets. (1) Show that a GE equilibrium exists (2) Show that
generically in a GE equilibrium dim(V(P, A)) = 5. The strategy with incom-
plete markets is the same. (1)' Show that a pseudo-equilibrium exists (2)'
Show that generically in a pseudo- equilibrium d\m(V(P,A)) = J. The concept
in (1)' which generalises a GE equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 7. A pseudo-equilibrium (ip- equilibrium) for the economy £(u>, A)
is a pair (i, P, L) G R.+7 x R++ x GJ(R
S
) which satisfies conditions (i) and (ii)
of an NA equilibrium of rank J (definition 4), condition (iii) being replaced by
(V(P,A))CL (16)
Thus a pseudo-equilibrium is a constrained GE equilibrium: each agent
satisfies the standard GE budget constraint (under P) and in addition for agents
i = 2, ..., / the date 1 excess expenditures (evaluated with the date prices Pi)
must lie in the subspace L. Just as in a GE equilibrium it can happen that
(V(P,A)) ^ R , so in a ^-equilibrium it can happen that {V{P,A))^L. The
transversality arguments in (2) and (2)' show that generically neither of these
strict inclusions can occur.
From the homogeneity of the budget equations (8) in a t/>-equilibrium, it is
clear that the prices P can be normalised to lie in the positive unit (n-l)-sphere
5tf-{p €1^+1^-1}
Since the GE budget constraint P{x x — u % ) — holds for each agent, Walras law
holds and we truncate the aggregate excess demand function (11): F — F =
(Pi, ..., Fn -i)- Thus (P,Z) £ S++ 1 x G J(R ) is a ip- equilibrium price-subspace
pair if and only if
F(P,L, W ) = (i)
(V(P,A))cL (ii)
The first step is to show that there exists a pair (P,L) which is a solution to
(17). This is the key step in establishing the existence of a GEI equilibrium.
Theorem 13- Let 5(u,u;,.4.) be a GEI exchange economy satisfying As-
sumption I, then a 1/' -equilibrium exists for all (a;, A) Efix.4.
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The second step is to show that generically the ^-equilibria are smooth
functions of the parameters and that ^-equilibria can always be perturbed so
that generically rank V(P,A) = J. These two properties may be summarised
as follows.
Lemma 3. There exists a generic set A C ft x A such that for each (w, A) G
A there are at most a Unite number of ij> -equilibria, each of which is locally a
C 1 function of the parameters (u>,A).
Lemma 4. There is a generic set A' C A such that for each (uj, A) 6
A'
,
(V(P,A)) = L for each ip-equilibrium.
Remark. When markets are potentially complete (17) (ii) is automatically
satisfied since L = R . Thus the conditions (17) reduce to the standard aggre-
gate excess demand equation characterising a GE equilibrium
F(P,w) = (18)
The problem of proving the existence of a solution to (17) thus reduces to the
problem of proving that (18) has a solution. The classical GE argument uses
Brouwer's Theorem to prove that (18) has a solution.
Grassmanian Manifold. The main difficulty in proving theorem 13 is the
presence of the complicated set G J(H ). The reader familiar with the concept
of a manifold will note that in the section Representation of Subspaces, we
performed the key steps in constructing an atlas for a smooth manifold structure
on G (R ) when we showed how all subspaces L in the neighborhood of any
subspace L 6 G (R ) can be put into one-to-one correspondence with (5 —
J) x J matrices E G E' " . Consistent with its natural topology, the set
7 CG (M ) can be given the structure of a smooth compact manifold of dimension
J(S — J), called the Grassmanian manifold of J -dimensional subspaces of Ml .
The Grassmanian is a canonical manifold which plays a key role in many parts
of modern mathematics.
The presence of the GrussTiianian makes it inappropriate to attempt to
apply conventional fixed point tlieorems (Brouwer, Kakutani) to prove theorem
13. The convexity assumption that underlies these theorems is simply not
relevant. Grassmanian manifolds are in general not even acyclic, so that even
the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem would not be applicable.
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We outline two approaches to proving theorem 13. The first is due to
Duffie-Shafer (1985) and gives lemma 3 as a by-product. The second due to
Husseini-Lasry-Magill (1986) and Hirsch-Magill-Mas-Colell (1987) shows that
theorem 13 is a special case of a much more general theorem. This theorem
(which can be stated in a number of equivalent forms) leads to a striking gener-
alisation of the classical Borsuk-Ulam theorem and contains Brouwers theorem
as a special case — we refer the reader to the above mentioned papers for de-
tails. Before presenting these two approaches to the existence problem it will
be useful to introduce two additional concepts that play an important role in
the differential topology approach to general equilibrium theory. The first is
the concept of the equilibrium manifold the second is the concept of degree.
Debreu's Regular Economies. In studying the problem of the unique-
ness of equilibrium in the GE model, Debreu (1970) was lead to introduce a
new approach to the qualitative analysis of equilibrium which has proved to
have far-reaching consequences. Previously the analysis of equilibrium for an
exchange economy £(u,u) had focussed on existence and optimality for fixed
characteristics (u,u>). Debreu conceived of the idea of leaving the profile of
preferences u = (u l ,...,u r ) fixed, but allowing the endowments u = (w 1 ,...^ )
to be viewed as parameters. He was thus led to introduce the approach of dif-
ferential topology. Using Sard's Theorem and the Implicit Function Theorem
he showed that generically in u, there is at most a finite number of equilibrium
prices, each of which is locally a smooth function of the parameter u. This
established the property of local uniqueness, but even more importantly it laid
the correct foundation for carrying out comparative static analysis in general
equilibrium theory.
An abstract formulation of this approach was developed by Balasko (1976,
19S8). The key idea is the introduction of the equilibrium manifold
E = {(P,u;) 6 Sl~ l x fi | F{P,u) = 0} (19)
induced by the excess demand equation (IS) and the projection
7T : E— Q (20)
defined by 7r(P,ii>) = u;. The equilibrium prices are then given by 7r -1 (u;). Since
E and ft are smooth manifolds, differential topology is applicable and since E
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and Q have the same dimension, the powerful tool of degree can be applied.
This approach to equilibrium theory provides a unified framework for analysing
the comparative statics properties of equilibria and their existence in a setting
of great generality. It is the contribution of Duffie-Shafer (1985) to have shown
almost ten years later that this abstract formulation provides a natural setting
for establishing the generic existence of equilibrium with incomplete markets.
Just as in the GE model (18) leads to the equilibrium manifold (19) so in
the GEI model (17) leads to the xp- equilibrium manifold
E= UP, L,u, A) e SH l x GJ{KS ) xtlxA
and the projection
F(P, L,u>)=0
(21)
(V(P,A))CL
'
7T : E — Q x A (22)
defined by 7r(P, L,u, A) = (u>, .4). Proving theorem 13 is equivalent to proving
7T
-1 (u;,A) 7^ </> for all (uj,A) 6 ft x A. The idea is to apply mod 2 degree
theory to the map ir : E — Q x A.
Mod 2 degree of map. Recall that if / : M — N is a C 1 proper map
between C 1 manifolds M and N with dimM = dimiV and N connected then
we can associate with / an important topological invariant called the mod 2
degree of f (written jj2 /) such that the number of points mod 2 in the preimage
set /
-1
(y) ( written fof'
1
^)) is the same for all y £ R/ (the set of regular
values of / ). Furthermore :/ j} 2 / ^ then f~ 1 (y) ^ ft for all y 6 N . The
standard way of applying degree theory is to make an astute choice of y G K./
for which it is straightforward to show ti2/
-1
(y) = 1-
Let / = 7r , M = E , N = Q X A. It is clear that Q. x A is a smooth
connected manifold with dim(Q x A) = nl + JLS. Thus in order to prove
theorem 13 (and lemma 3 by applying Sard's theorem) it suffices to show the
following:
(i) EisaC 1 submanif'old ofSJ" 1 xG J(MS)xQx A with dimE = nl + LS
J
(ii) 7r is proper
(iii) There exists (u;,.4)
€
i2w such that i 2 7r~
1
(u?-.^) — 1-
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Proof of (i). Let (p,L, Q,A) € E, and let H(p,E,u?,A) = denote the
system of equations (15) which represents E in a neighborhood of (p, L,d>, A).
Direct calculation shows rank^^i^p, E,£j,A)) = n — 1 + J{S — J), so that
is a regular value of H. Thus H~ l {G) C E is a manifold with dim if -1 (0) =
dim(f2 x A). E is the union of all such H~ l {0), so E is a manifold with
dimE = dimH x A.
Proof of (ii). We need to show 7t-1 (Jy) is compact for any compact set
K C 0. x A. Since G J(H ) is compact, n~ 1 (K) can fail to be compact only if
Tr-^A^nd S++ 1 x GJ(RS ) x K ^ / . But this is impossible by the boundary
behaviour of F inherited from the boundary behaviour of agent l's demand f 1 .
Proof of (iii). Pick a Pareto optimal allocation u> E ft and let P G 5?7
denote the unique associated price system. Pick A
€
A so thatV(P,A) is in
general position. Let L = ( V(P, A) ) then (P,Z,u),A) £ E and (P,L) is the
unique equilibrium price pair for (o>, .A). Showing that (a), A) is a regular value
of 7r reduces to showing that rank (Dp
tE H(P,E,u>, A)) = n — 1 + «/(•? — «/)
where E represents L. Q.E.D.
Oriented Degree. Mod 2 degree theory, rather than oriented degree theory
was used in the above argument because it is not known, in general, if E is an
orientable manifold. If E is orientable the same proof which shows that ^tt = 1
shows that the oriented degree is 1 for a suitable choice of orientation. The
advantage of being able to use the oriented degree of tt is that it would permit
the construction of an index theorem analogous to Dierker's index theorem for
a GE exchange economy and would permit a study of conditions under which
equilibrium is globally unique. E will certainly be orientable if V(P, .4) always
has full rank, and an index theorem could be written out for this case (we do
not know of anyone who has done this). If A is such that V(P, A) can change
rank with P, then two problems arise in attempting to verify if E is orientable.
The construction of E in Duffie-Shafer simply shows that E can be locally
represented as a solution of a transverse system of equations, from which it
is difficult to obtain information about orientability. Secondly, G (R ) itself
is orientable if and only if J(S — J) is odd, although it is difficult to believe
that being able to write down an index formula should depend on the parity of
J(S — J), which is not of immediate economic significance.
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Vector Bundle Approach. There is an abstract approach to the GEI
existence problem which may prove to have applications in other branches of
equilibrium theory and to which we would now like to draw the readers atten-
tion. The idea is to lift the problem into an abstract setting where finding a
solution of (17) can be viewed as showing that a system of equations has a so-
lution. The mathematical object which allows one to do precisely that is called
a vector bundle and is a powerful generalisation of the concept of a manifold. A
(smooth) vector bundle is a space which is locally homeomorphic to the carte-
sian product of a vector space and a manifold. To each point in the manifold is
associated a vector space which "twists" in a certain way as we move over the
manifold: but locally we can always untwist the vector space so that the vector
bundle looks like the above mentioned product. By introducing this concept
(as we show below) we can reduce the existence problem to a simple topological
property of an appropriately defined vector bundle.
In the above analysis Walras Law led us to replace F by its truncation
F. Alternatively Walras Law (PF(P,L) = for all (P,L) G S^' 1 x G J(R5 ))
implies that F defines a vector field on S++ 1 for each L £ G J (JR, ). By a
familiar argument, the boundary behavior of F (namely (Pm ,Lm ) £ £++* X
G J(R5),(Pm ,Lm ) —* (P,L) with P e dSl~\ implies ||F(Pmi Lm )|| — oo)
implies that F can be modified to a function F with the following properties:
(i) F is defined on 5J
_1
x G J{HJ )
(ii) F is inward pointing on the boundary dS£-1 for each L £ G J(R5 )
(iii) F has the same zeros as F.
The existence of a pseudo-equilibrium then follows from theorem 14 by setting
($,*) = (F,V)
Theorem 14. If $ : S^ 1 x G J(RS ) — IT is a continuous vector Held
on «S+
-1
which for each fixed L £ G J(RS ) is inward pointing and if the S x J
matrix valued function $ : SJ -1 x GJ(RS ) RSJ is continuous then there
exists (P,X)
€
S+-1 x G J{RS ) such that
$(P,Z) = 0, (*(P,£))CZ (23)
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Proof. The idea is to construct a vector bundle over the manifold S+~ x
G J(1R ) and a section such that (P,L) is a solution of (23) if and only if
this section intersects the zero section. The idea is then to show that the
topological structure of this vector bundle is such that every continuous section
must intersect the zero section. Hence the solution (23).
For a discussion of the properties of vector bundles we refer the reader to
Brocker and Janich (1983) and Hirsch (1976). The following definitions may
help to make some of what follows intelligible. An m- dimensional vector bundle
f = (E,M,n) over a manifold M is a triple where E (the total space) and M
(the base space) are manifolds, 7r : E —* M is a continuous surjective map and
where 7r -1 (x) = Ex (the fibre at x) is an m-dimensional vector space for all
x £ M, which satisfies:
(a) for each x £ M there exists an open set U containing x and a homeo-
morphism h : ^(U) —^xRm
(b) the restriction h x : Ex — x x Rm is an isomorphism of vector spaces.
When the vector space Ex is the tangent space to M at x, then the vector
bundle £ is called the tangent bundle of M (we write £ = tm). A section of
the vector bundle £ is a map a : M — E satisfying a{x) £ Ex for all x 6 M.
The zero section o~ : M — E is defined by ctq(x) = 6 Ex for all x £ M. A
vector field f on a manifold M defines a section of the tangent bundle tm by
a{x) = (x, /(x)) for all x £ A/.
Let r5 n-i denote the tangent bundle of <S£
-1
and let 7 J'5 = (r 7-5 , G J(R5 ), rr)
denote the vector bundle over the Grassmanian with total space
r
J
-
5
=
<^
{L,w) £ G J(RS ) x RSJ
w = (ty 1
, ..., u> )
Let £ = T\jn-i x 7
17
'
5 denote the cartesian product bundle and define the section
a of £ by
<t(p,£) = (p, l, *(p,£), n^* 1^, £),..., nLx* J(p,£))
where II^x denotes the projection onto L"1 . Clearly cr(P, L) = a (P, L) (where
o~q denotes the zero section) if and only if (P,X) solves (23).
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Mod 2 Euler Number of Vector Bundle. A vector bundle rj whose
fiber dimension equals the dimension of the base has a numerical invariant
associated with it called the mod 2 Euler number ( written e2 (T;)) such that
the number of points mod 2 at which any section a transverse to oq intersects
<7o ( written taC^^o)) is the same for all transverse sections (<r (i Co) and
jj 2 (<7, cr ) = 62(77). Furthermore if 62(77) = 1 then a (1 cr 7^ fi for all continuous
sections a. The standard way of applying the mod 2 Euler number is to make
an astute choice of section a for which it is straightforward to show %2{d, 00) =
1. In the case of a manifold with boundary (for example S+~ ) the equality
itaC^i 0"o ) = e2( 7/) remains true provided the vector bundle is the tangent bundle
of the manifold and provided the sections are restricted to vector fields which are
inward pointing on the boundary. The two geometric properties which explain
why theorem 14 works are then following.
Lemma 5. (i) e2 (r5n-i) = l (ii) e2(f J'S ) = 1.
Proof. (i) For any P
€ SJ+ 1 the vector field <f>(P) = -^ - P is inward
pointing and defines a section a of the tangent bundle r^n-i which satisfies
d(P) = (Tq(P) if and only if P = P. Since D p4> has rank n — 1,
dmaQ. Since we have exhibited a section a with a unique transverse inter-
section with the zero section <7o, it follows that e2(r5n-i) = 1. (ii) Pick
any L E G J (1R ) and let u 1 ,...,?*"7 denote J orthonormal vectors in R such
that L = (u 1
,
. .
.
, u
J
). Consider the section a of 7
J,S defined by a(L) =
(L,irL±u
1
,- • • ,-n-L±u
J
). Clearly 5(L) = ctq(L) if and only if L = L. It can
be shown by calculation that am ao so that e2{l J,S ) = 1 • Q.E.D.
From the multiplicative property of the mod 2 Euler number with respect to
a cartesian product of vector bundles, e2{r$ n-i x 7
J
'
5
) = e2(r5n-i) • e 2 (7
J
'
S
).
The proof of theorem 14 follows by applying lemma 5. Q.E.D.
Geometric Interpretation. Consider the case where n = 2, J — 1, 5 = 2.
7 1, is homeomorphic to the unit circle, rs \ is the tangent bundle to the positive
part of the unit circle, T 1,2 is the open Mobius band (see Figure 2). It is the
boundary behaviour of excess demand <£ which ensures 62(^-1) = 1 and it is
the twisting of the fiber as we move along the zero section (the basic topological
property of the vector bundle 7
1
'2
) which ensures e2(7 1,2 ) = 1.
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Remark. Lemma 5(i) is the inward-pointing vector field theorem which gives
existence for the GE model (the Arrow-Debreu theorem) and is equivalent to
Brouwer's theorem. Lemma 5(ii) is the new property induced by the GEI model:
it can be viewed as a subspace fixed-point theorem. The cartesian product bundle
f = rs™-i x 7
J,S
r'^^u,
b<iu£f
s;* «W)
a,b,c pseudo-equilibria
Figure 2
3S
thus provides a geometric decomposition of the problem of existence of equilib-
rium when markets are incomplete: the first component is the vector bundle
for equilibrium with complete markets, or more generally for the real market
component of the rp- equilibrium, the second component is the subspace vec-
tor bundle introduced by the incomplete financial markets namely the subspace
compatibility condition of a ^-equilibrium.
References. The first existence results with incomplete markets without con-
straints on agents' asset trades were obtained for the GEI model with nominal
assets (see References in section 3). In the special case of numeraire assets
an existence theorem was given by Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis (1986) (see
also Ciaae (1988)). In this case an equilibrium exists for all parameter values,
since (with prices normalised) the rank of the returns matrix V never changes.
For the general case considered in this section, in addition to the papers of
Duffie-Shafer (19S5), Husseini-Lasry-Magill (1986) and Hirsch-Magill-Mas-
Colell (1987) mentioned above, Geanakoplos-Shafer (1987) have presented a
general existence theorem which includes theorem 13 as a special case.
2.3 Stochastic Exchange Economy
The model of the previous sections can be enriched by viewing the equi-
librium in the economy as a stochastic process over many time periods, t =
0, 1,...,T. The underlying exchange economy can be extended to a stochastic
economy by modelling the uncertainty via an event-tree. There is a finite set
of states of nature S and a collection of partitions F = (Ft )f=Q of S where Ft+i
is a refinement of Ft and Fo = S, Ft = {{$}} ^c- F defines an information
structure in that at each date t = 0,...,T exactly one of the "events" a 6 Ft
has occurred and this is known to each agent in the economy. If a
€
Ft has oc-
curred the possible events a' £ Ft+ i that can occur at t + 1 are those satisfying
o" C o. The filtration F then defines an event-tree as follows. Let D = U<=o Ft
(disjoint union) be the set of nodes. For each node £ 6 D there is exactly one t
and one a 6 Ft such that £ = (t,cr). The unique node £ = (0,cr) is called the
root node. For each £ € .D\fo, £ = ( t ^ a ) there is for t - 1 a unique a' € Ft-i
such that a' D a\ the node £~ = (t — l,<r') is called the predecessor of £. Let
D~ = (J,_ Ft (disjoint union) denote the set of all nonterminal nodes. For
39
each (6D" with £ = («,<r), let £+ = {£' = (t + 1,<t')| tr* C <x} denote the set
of immediate successors of £. The number of elements in the set £+ is called
the branching number of the node f and is written &(£). Finally we say that £
succeeds ^'(weakly) if £ = (r,cr), £' = (r, cr') satisfy t > r (< > r), cr C a' and
we write £>£'(£> £')•
With this notation the commodity space C(D, It ) consists of all functions
/ : .D — R , namely the collection of all R -valued stochastic processes,
which for brevity we write as C. Each consumer i (i — 1, ...,/) has a stochastic
endowment process w* £ C++ (the strictly positive orthant of C) and a utility
function u' : C+ — R satisfying Assumption 1 on the commodity space C+.
Given the information structure F if we let (u, w) = (u 1
, ..., u
r
,
tu
1
, ..., w1 ) then
£(u,w; F) denotes the associated stochastic exchange economy.
GE and GEI Equilibrium. As in section 2.1 we can define two market
structures for the economy £(u,uj; F), that of GE and that of GEI. If we define
a contingent price process P £ C++ then the contingent market (GE) budget
set of agent : is defined by
B(P,wf ) = {x { e C+\ P(x i - w { ) = 0}
A contingent market (CM) equilibrium is then given as before by Definition 1.
We also refer to such an equilibrium as a GE equilibrium.
To keep the description of a GEI equilibrium simple we assume that there
are J assets all initially issued at date 0. With slight complication of notation
the case where assets are introduced at subsequent nodes £ ^ £o can also be
treated. Real asset j is characterised by a map AJ : D — R with AJ (£o) = 0.
One unit of asset _;' held at £o promises to deliver the commodity vector AJ (£)
at node £, for £ £ D. Assets are retraded at all later dates, so that one unit of
asset j purchased at node £ promises the delivery of AJ (£') for all f > f. We
let A = (A 1 ,..., A ) denote the asset structure and we let A denote the set of
all asset structures. If A(f ) = [A 1 (£)...
A
7
(£)], £ £ D and p £ C+ is a stochastic
spot price process then
v 3 (0 = p(Z)A } (0, ZeD (24)
is the dividend (in units of account) paid by asset j (j = 1,...,J) at node
£. A security price process is a map q : D H with q(£) = for £ £
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D~ (the terminal value condition) : q(£) is the vector of after-dividend prices
of the J assets at node £. The trading strategy of agent : is a map z x : D — R.
with z'(£) = for £ £ D~ : z'(f ) is the portfolio of the J assets purchased by
agent i at node £ after the previous portfolio has been liquidated. With this
notation agent z's decision problem in the GEI model is:
maxii 1^') subject to
(P) rt?o)(*'"Ko) - «•'(&)) = -q(Mz {(M
p(0(x«(o-^'(o) = [p(OA(o + ?(o]^(r)-?(o^(o, v(6D\(o
Definition 8. A financial market (FM) equilibrium for the stochastic ex-
change economy £(u, w; F) is a pair ((x, z), (p, ?)) = ((i 1 , ..., x f , z l , ..., z f ), (p, q))
such that
(i) (x*',z i ) solves {V), i = 1,...,/
(ii) £(*•"- to'") = (iii) Er'=o
i=i i=i
We also refer to such an equilibrium as a GEI equilibrium.
No-arbitrage equilibrium. As in the two period case, the asset price pro-
cess q in an FM equilibrium satisfies a no-arbitrage condition and this property
allows the equilibrium to be transformed into an analytically more tractable
form. Let us show how this new concept of equilibrium is derived. Given the
asset structure A and a spot price process p, we say that the security price
process q admits no arbitrage possibilities (NA) if there is no trading strategy
generating a non-negative return at all nodes and a positive return in a least
one node. By the same argument as in the two period case, q satisfies NA given
(A,p) if and only if there exists a stochastic state price (present value) process
P : D —> R++
such that
0(O<7(O= E W) btf'Mtf') + *(£')], V£€Zr (25)
so that the present value (i.e. the value at date 0) of the asset prices at node £ is
the present value of their dividend and capital values over the set of immediate
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successors £
+
. Solving this system of equations recursively over the nodes leads
to the equivalent statement
««) =m £ 0{° P{a A{a V ZZD- (25)'
namely that the current value of each asset at node £ is the present value of its
future dividend stream over all succeeding nodes f ' > f
.
It is clear from (24) that real assets yield a return at each node f which is
proportional to the current spot price p(0- Thus the budget constraints in (V)
remain-unchanged if the system of prices (p(f )»•<?(£))» £ 6 D is replaced by the
system of prices (o(0 p(0> a(0 ^(O)? £ £ D f°r anY positive scalar process
a : D — R++- As in the two-period case, in an economy with only real assets
price levels are unimportant.
As in section 2.1 the key idea is to introduce what amount to generalized
Arrow-Debreu (GE) prices so that the GEI equilibrium is transformed into a
constrained GE equilibrium. Thus we define a stochastic date present value
price process P : D — R by
P = p a p = (/?(£) P(0)^D (26)
where the box-product now extends over all nodes in the event tree. For P :
D — R and x : D — R it is convenient to define for each £ € D~ the
box-product over the successors of £
Pa *=(£ PK")*(0)
, +
eR6(0
P x is thus the vector of present values of the consumption stream x, started
at each of the immediate successor nodes £' of f . For each £ 6 D~ we may define
the &(£) x J matrix of asset returns
ii(w)=(p(rM(f"))(W£'€£"
£">£'
where the j column is the b(£)—vector of present values of dividends from the
j
l
asset, starting at each of the immediate successors of £, namely £' G £+ .
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If we let (V^) denote the subspace of II ™ spanned by the J columns of the
matrix V^ and if we substitute (25)' and (26) into the budget constraints in (V)
then we are led to the equivalent decision problem for agent i
max u^x') subject to
(vy P(x { - w { ) = o
Pa (*'-W)€(Vi(P,A)>, ^D"
z
As in the two-period case the budget set implied by these constraints is the
same for all no-arbitrage state price processes j3. Let A* : D — R++ denote
the multiplier process induced by the constraints in (V). If we choose /? = A 1
then agent l's budget set reduces to the GE budget set B(P,w 1 ) denned above.
We need to be able to consider equilibria in which for each nonterminal
node £ 6 D~ , the subspace of income transfers (V^) is of fixed dimension p(£)
with < p(£) < min (J, 6(£)). Define the product of the Grassmanian manifolds
over the nonterminal nodes
G p,5 = Y[ <7>«>(Il
6(0
). (p,6) = (p(0,HO) ieD - (27)
Z€D-
then for any L G Gp ' b , L = (L^)^eD - . We define the NA budget set of agent i
for each (P, L, w { ) £ C++ x Gp > b x C++ by
B(P,L,w { )= I x { ec+
P(i ,'-u; ,') =
(28)
P (x'-u>«)€^, ZeD~
which reduces to (9) when T = 1. Then a normalized no-arbitrage (NA) equi-
librium of rank p = (p(0)*
€D - with < p(£) < min (J, 6(0), V £ € D~ , is a
pair (x,P,L) eCjx C++ x G p,i satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of definition
4 with (iii) replaced by
(V^(P,A)) = Z
€l VteD- (29)
Lemma 2 is again true: thus an FM equilibrium of rank p is equivalent to
an NA equilibrium of rank p. To prove the generic existence of a GEI equi-
librium one proceeds as in the two-period case, defining a -pseudo -equilibrium
(^-equilibrium) as a normalized no-arbitrage equilibrium of maximal rank (i.e.
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p(£) = min( J, &(£))> V^GD ) in which (29) is replaced by the weaker condi-
tion
(v«(/U))cZ«, V£Gir (30)
The kernel of the proof of the existence of a GEI equilibrium lies in showing that
a -equilibrium exists for all parameter values (w, A). Once this is established
a transversality argument shows that there is a generic subset of the param-
eters such that for all economies in this subset every V'-equilibrium is an NA
equilibrium of maximum rank.
Generically Complete Markets. In a two period economy there are poten-
tially complete markets if J > S, namely when the number of assets is sufficient
to cover the possible contingencies (see section 2.2A). In the stochastic economy
there are potentially complete markets if J > &(£) (or more generally when the
number of tradeable assets varies over the nodes if J(f ) > &(£)) f°r a^ £ £ D~
.
Thus if we take J as fixed, what matters is the amount of information revealed
at each node £ measured by 6(£ ). If assets can be traded sufficiently often and
if at each date-event f information is revealed sufficiently slowly then the con-
dition can in principle be satisfied: this of course is the idea of frequent trading
in a few assets which is the key idea underlying the Black- Scholes theory (for a
discussion of this in the context of finance see Duffie (1990)).
If J > 6(£) for all nontermial nodes £ then the budget set B(P, L,w') in
an NA equilibrium of maximum rank reduces to the GE budget set B(P,w')
so that a ^-equilibrium is a GE equilibrium. In this case the existence of a
0-equilibrium follows from the standard GE existence theorem. To establish
the existence of a GEI equilibrium it thus only remains to find conditions on
the asset structure A which ensure that for most price processes P,
rank^(P,.4)=&(0, V £G D~ (31)
so that (29) holds. Just as in the two period case there is a notion of regularity
which does this.
Definition 8. The asset structure A in a stochastic economy is regular if for
each node £ € D~ and each immediate successor £' £ £+ one can choose a J-
vector a(£') from the rows of the collection of matrices {A(£")).„
>( , such that
the collection of induced vectors over the immediate successors (a(£* )),,.+ is
linearly independent.
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Remark. An asset structure A is regular if and only if there exists a price
process P : D — R such that (31) holds. Thus regularity can only be
satisfied if
J > &(0, V £ € D- (32)
when the number of assets is fixed and more generally if 7(0 > 6(0, V £ 6 D~
when the number of assets varies. When this condition holds it can be shown
that regularity is a generic property of asset structures. In fact it is a generic
property of asset structures A for which the assets pay dividends only at the
terminal date T.
As in definition 5 of section 2.2A let Ea(uj) denote the set of financial
market equilibrium allocations for the stochastic economy £a(u) and let Ec{w)
denote the set of contingent market equilibrium allocations for the parameter
value u. The characterisation -problem of section 2.2A has also been completely
solved for a stochastic economy (recall theorems 5 and 8).
Theorem 15. There is a generic subset Q* C fi such that
EA(u) = Ec(u), Vwefi'
if and only if the asset structure A is regular.
Remark. The difficult part in proving theorem 15 lies in showing Ea(w) C
Ec(uj )i V w 6 fi* (the analogue of theorem 3). It is here that the concept
of an NA equilibrium of rank p with p(£) < min(J, 6(0) f°r some £ E D~ is
used. The key idea (as with theorem 3) is that for such equilibria the number
of equations exceeds the number of unknowns and such systems of equations
generically have no solution.
Incomplete Markets. When (31) is not satisfied we say that the asset
markets in the stochastic economy are incomplete. In this case there is at least
one nontermial node £ at which
rank Vt(P,A) < 6(0
and at such a node agents have limited ability to redistribute their income over
the immediately succeeding nodes. Thus if A is not regular, which is the case
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if J < 6(f) for some £ G D~, then the asset markets are incomplete. In this
case the GE existence theorem is not applicable to prove the existence of a
^-equilibrium. The two approaches outlined in section 2.2B can be extended
to a stochastic economy.
If n = (#D)L denotes the number of spot markets over the event-tree, we
let S++ 1 = {P G C++| Yle e PfiO = l} denote the associated positive unit
sphere in C and define GPyh as the product of Grassmanian manifolds (27) with
p(£) = min(j, &(£))» V £ G I?
-
. The first approach is based on a consideration
of the ^-equilibrium manifold
E = {(P,L iu,A)GSl+1 xGp'bx£lxA\(P,L) is a ^-equilibrium for (u;,A)}
and the associated projection map t : E — Cl x A. The argument follows
the same steps as in the two-period case. In the second approach the existence
of a 0-equilibrium is an immediate consequence the following generalization of
theorem 14.
Theorem 16. Let (a, 6) = (a(fl,6(0)
€€D -i «(0 < KO, V £ G
£"
and iet G a ' & = n^D- C?a(0(K6(0 ). If $ : <S+
_1
x Ga - 6 - Rn is a continuous
vector Held on 5+
-1
which for each fixed L G G a,b is inward pointing and if the
6(£) x a(f ) matrix vaiued functions
^^ : 5^
_1
x G a ' b —* H6(0a(0
,
V £ G £>~
are continuous, then there exists (P,£) G 5+
-1
x G a ' 6 such that
$(P,L) = 0, (*
€
(P,L))CL
€| VCGL>-
Remark. Consider the collection of vector bundles -y^O.KO^ £ £)- over the
Grassmanians G a^(R6^'),£ G D~. The proof is based on the multiplcative
property of the mod 2 Euler number of the cartesian product and the use of
lemma 5 which gives
The second step consists in using a pertubation (transversality) argument
to show that there is a generic subset of the parameter space 0, x A for which
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(29) holds at every t/>- equilibrium. For a fixed information structure F, let
E(lj, A) denote the set of FM equilibrium allocations of the stochastic economy
with parameters (u,A).
Theorem 17. If J < 6(f) for some £ £ D~ then there exists a generic set
A C £1 x A such that E(u,A) consists of a positive finite number of equilibria
for each (u>,A) G A.
Remark. The pertubation argument requires that at any nonterminal node
f for which J < 6(f), that there be J(b(t) — J) free parameters in (.4(£')) ,
in order to perturb the matrix V^(P,A). Thus, in particular, it is not possible
to replace A by the subset A' consisting of assets which pay dividends only at
the terminal date T. This is in contrast to theorem 15 which permits such asset
structures. It would thus be of considerable interest if the following conjecture
could be proved.
Conjecture: for all J and all asset structures A with J assets, there is a
generic set Qa C ft such that E(u,A) ^ <f for all u G £Ia-
Remark. This section has presented a brief summary of the GEI model with
real assets for the case of a multiperiod exchange economy. There is a wealth of
interesting properties of the underlying GEI model (such as the martingale and
volatility properties of asset prices (LeRoy (1989)) that we have not attempted
to analyse. The reader will recognise that in the one good case (L=l) the
resulting GEI model is essentially the basic model of the theory of finance.
In his analysis of the relation between the Black-Scholes theory and the GEI
model Kreps (1982) made clear that even in such a one good model, when there
are three or more periods one can at best expect to obtain a generic existence
theorem. The techniques and concepts of this section are thus likely to provide
an appropiate analytical framework for a broader class of GEI models than
might at first be expected.
References. The basic event- tree model of an exchange economy together
with the concept of a CM equilibrium was given by Debreu (1959). The idea
that frequent trading in a few securities can dramatically increase spanning was
first systematically exploited by Black-Scholes (1973). Kreps (19S2) presented
a general equilibrium model and showed that if the condition J > 6(0 for all
£ holds then any CM eqtiilibrium for £(u,u,F) can be implemented as a FM
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equilibrium for almost all .4 with J assets. The equivalence result (theorem
15) was given by Magill-Shafer (1985). The proof of existence with incomplete
markets was given by Duffie-Shafer (1986a, 1986b).
3. Nominal Assets
The object of this section is to study the nature of GEI equilibria when
some or all of the assets are nominal. Asset j is called a nominal asset if it
promises to deliver an exogenously given stream NJ = (N( , . .
.
, N$) of units of
account (dollars) across the states at date 1. The riskless bond, for which N 3 =
(1, . .
.
, 1) is the simplest example of such an asset. It should not be surprising
that the equilibria of a model with nominal assets behave very differently from
the equilibria of a model with real assets. Basic economic intuition suggests the
reason. Real assets are contracts promising dividends which are proportional
to the prices in each state: doubling prices in any state doubles the dividend
income that these assets generate. In short real assets are inflation proof. This
is not the case with nominal assets: if the spot prices (in some state) are
doubled since the dividend income remains unchanged the purchasing power of
the nominal asset's return is halved. But what are the consequences of this for
the resulting GEI equilibria?
VValras' Test. A good way of obtaining a rough (and as we shall see, basically
correct) answer is to go back to an old idea of Walras: let's coxmt the number
of unknowns and equations, being careful to factor out any redundancy. Let
z
l (p,q,u'), zifaq,^), z = l,...,7 (33)
denote the I agents demand functions for the L(S + 1) goods and the J assets.
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A vector of GEI equilibrium prices (p, q) is a solution of the system of equations
Ffeg,w) = J](5
,
"(p,ff,w')-w,") =
7 (34)
<?te*,w) = ]Ti,'(p,g,u> ,') =
i=i
Are the £(5 + 1) + J equations in (34) independent? Certainly not. Let
F = (F ,Fi , . .
.
, F$), then the fact that each agent fully spends his income in
each state implies that we have 5 + 1 Walras' Laws
pQFo + qG = J PsF3 -VsG = 0, 5 = 1,..., 5 (35)
Thus there are at most L(S + 1) + J — (S+ 1) independent equations. This' is
true regardless of the type of assets we are considering, whether real or nominal.
What is the dimension of the set of prices (p, q)? Let us lay aside the fact
that we need to restrict attention to no-arbitrage asset prices: this will not alter
the argument that follows. Consider first the case where all the financial assets
are real assets. Pick any vector of inflation factors a = (a
, ori , . .
.
, <*$) £ R++
then we have seen that since each agents budget set is independent of the price
levels
F{a a p,a q,uj) = F(p,q,u>)
(36)
G(a a p,a q,u) = G(p,q,u)
These S + 1 homogeneity conditions correspond to the fact that there are 5 + 1
directions in which price changes have no real effects. If we factor out these 5+1
dimensions of redundant prices then the equilibrium equations (34) become a
system of equations which typically has (L — 1)(5+1)+ J independent equations
in the same number of "relative" prices (p, q). Hence the conclusion: with real
assets there is generically a finite number of GEI equilibria (see lemmas 3 and
4 in section 2.2B): Thus the concept of a GEI equilibrium with real assets is
well-defined (determinate).
Suppose now that all the financial assets are nominal. Then provided the
matrix of nominal asset returns satisfies a non-degeneracy condition, there are
at least two directions (easily checked from the budget equations) and in fact
only two directions (proved in next subsection) in which price changes have no
real effects, namely those defined by the scalars ao,o;i E R-n- with
(POitf) (<*0P0,O:04), (/>1,?) (rtlPl,
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the vector pi denoting the vector of spot prices at date 1. The equilibrium
equations (34) thus typically have L(S + l) + J — (S+ 1) independent equations
in L(S + 1) + J — 2 unknown prices. Walras' test applied to the GEI model
with nominal assets implies that there are S — 1 less equations than unknowns.
Hence the conclusion: with nominal assets the set of GEI equilibrium prices
is generically an S — 1 dimensional set. Since we have factored out the price
changes which leave the budget sets unchanged it would seem that these S — 1
dimensions of prices should correspond to S — 1 dimensions of distinct real
equilibrium allocations. If this is the case, then surely we are led to conclude
that the concept of a GEI equilibrium with nominal assets as it stands is not
well-defined? We shall see that this is indeed the case (section 3.1).
The Walrasian test applied to the GEI model reveals an essential distinction
between real and nominal assets. In the model with real assets since price levels
are unimportant there is no need to explicitly introduce a role for money: indeed
in such a model money is unimportant. However in a model with nominal assets
to obtain a well-defined concept of equilibrium we need to explicitly introduce a
role for money as a medium of exchange. Thus nominal assets in the GEI model
lead us to the concept of a monetary equilibrium in which money influences the
equilibrium allocation in an essential way. In this way the indeterminacy of the
nominal asset equilibrium is translated into the property that money has real
effects in the monetary equilibrium (section 3.2).
3.1 Indeterminacy of GEI Equilibrium with Nominal Assets
The object of this section is to make precise the sense in which there is
indeterminacy in the GEI model with nominal assets and to reveal why the
indeterminacy arises. We will see that the indeterminacy of equilibrium can be
traced to the conjuntion of the following three properties of the model.
(1) Nominal assets are contracts which promise returns denominated in the
unit of account (say dollars).
(2) Variations in the purchasing power of the unit of account across the
states at date 1 give rise to different equilibria.
(3) There is no mechanism endogenous to the model which determines the
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purchasing power of the unit of account across the states at date 1.
(1) is obvious and (3) is clear given (2). Understanding the indeterminacy of
equilibrium thus amounts to understanding (2).
When all the J assets are nominal the date 1 returns matrix (1) can be
written as
V = N =
N}
l*l
jiNi
*s
We assume that there are no redundant assets so that rank N = J : our principal
interest lies in the case where the asset markets are incomplete so that J < S.
A GEI equilibrium in which all assets •areTrommal is called z.- nominal -asset
equilibrium.
Let ((x,z),(p,q);N) denote such an equilibrium when the nominal asset
structure is given by N. The key to understanding (2) lies in noting that a
nominal asset equilibrium can be viewed as a GEI equilibrium in which all
J assets are real numeraire assets (example 2 in section 2.1). This is in fact
immediate: for nominal asset j pays Nj units of account in state s and this is
'Ni'
equivalent to a real numeraire asset which pays
Pal
units of good 1. Thus
if we define the diagonal matrix (representing the purchasing power of a unit of
account across the states at date 1)
"i =
V\
L o vs ±
where v„ — —
,
5 = 1,.. .,5 (37)
Pal
then ((x,z),(p,q);[vi]N) is a real numeraire asset equilibrium with good 1
returns matrix
(38)
Conversely if we pick any positive diagonal matrix [fi] (i.e. us > 0, 5 = 1, . . . , S)
and if ((x, z), (p, q); [u\}N) is a real numeraire asset equilibrium with good 1
returns matrix defined by (3S) which in addition satisfies (37) (we can always as-
sume this since with real assets we are free to adjust the equilibrium price levels)
-.41,
.
A J 1 'V\ - -N} . . . iV/
"
. '^Sl • A
J
. ^5- M .. Ni m
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then ((x, z), (p, q); N) is a nominal asset equilibrium. Thus ((x, z), (p, q); N) is
a nominal asset equilibrium if and only if there exists a positive diagonal matrix
[v-i] such that ((x, z),(p,q);[v1 ]N) is a real numeraire asset equilibrium.
Let E'(u,N) denote the set of nominal asset GEI equilibrium allocations
for the returns matrix N and let E{u, \v\\N) denote the set of numeraire asset
equilibrium allocations for the matrix (38). The choice of a positive diagonal
matrix
W e M = s£
;
!
lying in the positve (5 — 1) dimensional unit sphere corresponds to the choice of
a profile of purchasing power for the unit of account across the states at date 1.
As we shall show below for most choices of the parameters (a;, i/x ) we obtain a
finite number of equilibrium allocations. Thus for a given profile of purchasing
power v\ the GEI model becomes well- defined. Since
E'(u,N) = [JE(u^u1}N)
analysing the GEI nominal asset equilibrium allocations reduces to studying the
family of real numeraire asset equlibrium allocations E(u, \v\\N) as v\ varies
in jV. We shall view this as a problem of comparative statics of equilibria for
which the equilibrium manifold approach of section 2.2B provides the canonical
framework.
To this end we transform the equilibrium into an NA equilibrium by intro-
ducing (date 0) present value prices
P = (3 p with = A 1
and define the diagonal matrix of present value prices of good 1 across the states
at date 1
Pn
[^i] =
PsJ
It is easy to check that since rank [^i][i/i]Ar = J for all u\ £ M and all
strictly positive matrices [Pi], if we substitute equation (17)(ii) (which now
holds with equality) into equation (17)(i) by defining F : S++* x Q x M —
IT" 1 with
F(P,u;,r/i) = F(P,([P1 ][i/1]JV);w)
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then the equilibrium equations (17) reduce to
F(P1 u,,v1) = Q (39)
The following result can be viewed as a consequence of theorem 13: it can also
be established directly using the standard techniques of GE.
Theorem 18. Under Assumption 2, E'(u,N) ^ / for all (u,N) £ ft x RSJ .
We now begin a study of the "size" of E'(uj,N). A familiar argument
shows that equations (39) can be "controlled" by appropriately varying the
endowments a;, so that F fB 0. Thus the equilibrium manifold (21) reduces to
E={(P,u;, i/1)€^; 1 xfixAf | F(P,u;, I/1 ) = 0}
which is a manifold of dimension nl + S — 1. The projection 7r : E — Q x H
is proper. Thus by Sard's theorem the set A of regular values of tt is a generic
subset of n X M. In a neighborhood A( lii> 1 ) of each regular value (u>, u^) £ A,
each equilibrium price vector P can be written as a smooth function P(u>, r^i) of
the parameters. Let x *(P, u>) = f
1 (P,u> 1 ) denote agent l's GE demand function
and for i = 2,...,/ let x { (P,uj, vx ) = /'(P, ([PiHi'ilA'');^) denote agent z's
demand function (where /' is defined by (10)), then the equilibrium allocation
x = (x 1
,
. . .
,
x
7
) is a smooth function x(P(cj, Ui),uj, u{) of (u;, ux ).
Let z l (P,u,i/i) denote the portfolio which finances agent z's net expendi-
ture at date 1, i.e.
Pi n{x\(P,uJ,v1 )-u[) = [P1 }[vl}NV(P,uj,v1 ), t = 2,...,J
We want to show that if there are sufficiently many agents relative to the
number of assets (/ > J) then there is a generic subset A* C A such that in
an equilibrium the J vectors
{z i {P(u; J ul)^u1 ) Ji^}
are linearly independent. To this end for a
€
S J 1 (the (J — 1) dimensional
unit sphere) consider the function g : S++ l x A(^iPl ) x SJ
~ }
— IiJ defined
by
J+i
g{ P, u.', ux ,<*) = J on i'(P, u, vx )
i=2
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and h = (F,g) : S++ 1 x A(c,,Pl ) x 5"7
" 1
— Rn_1 x RJ . The asset demands
of the agents can be "controlled" without affecting the demands for goods, by
appropriately redistributing endowments of the agents: thus hu\ 0.
If we consider the manifold
E = {(P,u;, l/1,a)€5;; 1 x A (i,ti>l) x S J
~ l
\ h(P,u, uu a) = 0}
then we find that the projection tc : E — A(
l^ >i>1 ) is proper so that by Sard's
theorem the set of regular values AT. .
^
is generic. Since dim (Rn_1 x R*7 ) >
dim (<S++ x S J~ l ) i.e. the number of equations exceeds the number of un-
knowns, tt~ 1 (u,vi) = <£ , V (w,i/i) £ Af . x. Repeating the argument in a
standard way over a countable collection of regular values gives the desired set
A* on which the property of linear independence holds.
Consider (cU, z7x ) £ A* and pick (w, i/x ) in a neighborhood of (uJ, Vi) with
^i 7^ Fi. We want to show that
x{P(u, Vl ),u>,vx) ^ x(P{Z5,Vi),Z3,vx ) (40)
so that for fixed w, changing v\ changes the equilibrium allocation. Suppose
that with ui ^ v\ equality holds in (40). Then from the first order conditions
for agent 1, P = P(uJ, ux ) = P(u,u{) = P so that
((Px a(x[-u[))
J£) = ((P 1 n(x[-u[))£) (41)
Since the J vectors on the left and right side of (41) are linearly independent
we will have arrived at a contradiction if we can show that
(WiW # (\Pi]N) (42)
Definition 9. An S X J matrix N with J < S is in general position if every
J x J submatrix of N has rank J.
Lemma 6. Let N be an S x J matrix in general position with J < S. If
6,6e H++ satisfy ([6]N) = {[6}N) then there exists a£ R such that 6 = c.8.
Proof. Without loss of generality let S = (1,... , 1). Let 8 € R++ satisfy
([<5]JV) = (TV). Thus each column of the matrix [S]N can be written as a linear
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combination of the columns of the matrix N. There is thus a J x J matrix
C such that [6]N = NC. Thus CTNS = 89N9 , s = 1,...,5 so that (6a ,N9 )
is an eigenvalue-eigenvector pair for CT . We want to show that there exists
a G K such that 6 = (£i,...,£s) = a(l,. • •,]•)• Since the subspaces spanned by
eigenvectors associated with distinct eigenvalues form a direct sum, unless all
eigenvalues coincide 6\ = ... = 6$ = a. we contradict the general position of
N. Q.E.D.
Consider the projection 7? : ft xM— ft. Since the projection of a generic
set is generic, ft* = ?r(A*) is a generic subset of ft. For each u 6 ft* there exists
Vi 6 M such that (uj,ui) £ A*. There is thus a neighborhood N?x of Fx such
that the equilibrium allocation map
x
m
:AT7l ^Rn/ , x*(v1 ) = x(P(u,u1),u,v1 )
is C 1 and injective. We have thus proved the following theorem.
Theorem 19. Let E'(uj,N) be the set of equilibrium allocations of the
nominal asset economy £'(u;,N). If Assumption 1 holds and (i) < J < S
(ii) I > J (Hi) N is in general position, then there exists a generic set ft* C ft
such that for each u
€
ft*, E'(uj,N) contains the image of a C 1 injective map
of an open set of dimension 5 — 1.
Remark. If rank N = S then the subspaces satisfy [^i]iV = R for all v\ E
<S++ • The equilibria coincide with the GE equilibria and are thus generically
finite and locally unique.
Remark. There is a close connection between theorem 19 and the earlier
theorem 12: both assert that when markets are incomplete changing the asset
structure changes the equilibrium allocation. In both cases changing the asset
structure twists the subspace of date 1 income transfers so that some agent's
date 1 net expenditures (Px (x\ — uj\)) are no longer affordable. Theorem 19
however considers a restricted set of subspace changes, namely (N) — ([^i]^)
with v-i £ M. It thus requires the additional assumption that if we exclude
agent 1, there be enough agents (/ — 1 > J) so that generically their date 1 net
expenditures span the subspace of income transfers. In this way any change in
the subspace is sure to leave some agent's date 1 net expenditures out of the
new subspace.
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Remark. IfN is not in general position or more generally if the returns matrix
V consists of a mixture of real and nominal assets then not every change in v±
changes the subspace of income transfers. Thus the equilibrium set E'(u,N)
contains the image of an injective map of an open set which is typically of
dimension less than 5 — 1: in most cases the dimension remains positive, Arrow
securities which pay a unit of account in one state and nothing otherwise being
an exception.
References. The GEI model with nominal assets first appears in Arrow
(1953) where N = I (the 5 x 5 identity matrix). It was extended to the case
of a general returns matrix N by Cass (1984) and Werner (1985) who proved
theorem -18 (see also Werner (1989)). The first example of indeterminacy with
nominal assets was given by Cass (1985). Theorem 19 is due to Geanakoplos-
Mas-Colell (19S9) and Balasko-Cass (1989). The latter authors also show that if
asset prices are exogenously fixed then there is still indeterminacy of dimension
S — J. An important concept that we have not dealt with in this section is the
idea of restricted participation — that is, not all agents may have full access to
the asset markets. In the framework of the nominal asset model, Balasko-Cass-
Siconolfi (1987) have shown that even if the returns matrix N has full rank if
there is a subgroup of agents with restricted ability to participate on the asset
markets then there is still indeterminacy of dimension 5—1.
Remark. The authors cited above interpret theorem 19 as the assertion
that when markets are incomplete the equilibrium allocations that arise in an
economy with nominal assets are seriously indeterminate: the dimension of
indeterminacy is of the same magnitude as the degree of uncertainty about the
future (5 — 1).
The different equilibria whose existence is asserted by theorem 19 arise by
varying the purchasing power v-i of the unit of account across the states at date
1. As the proof of the theorem makes clear, a given equilibrium corresponds to
a particular profile V\ of purchasing power: to correctly anticipate equilibrium
prices (q,p) agents must correctly anticipate the future purchasing power vy
of the unit of account. But there is no data in the model of the economy
which indicate how the different profiles of purchasing power Vi 6 j\f come
to be chosen or are agreed upon by the agents: the parameters v\ G M are
simply free variables. What is needed is clear: the purchasing power of the unit
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of account must be determined by equilibrium equations just like any other
variable in the model.
3.2 Monetary Equilibrium and Real Effects of Money
In the nominal asset model originally introduced by Cass (1984) and Werner
(1985), the unit of account is typically viewed as the unit induced by money:
the bonds for example pay off in dollars. But the money thus introduced only
performs its first function, namely to act as a unit of account. Its second and
third functions, namely to act as a medium of exchange and a store of value are
left unmodelled.
Magill-Quinzii (19S8) have presented a model which preserves the basic
structure of the nominal asset economy but which adds a monetary framework
in which all three functions of money can be analysed, albeit in a stylised way.
They model the role of money as a medium of exchange via a cash-in-advance
constraint. To separate the activities of sale and purchase of commodities in-
exchange for money they split each period into three subperiods. In the first
subperiod agents sell their endowments to a central exchange receiving in re-
turn a money income. In the second subperiod they trade on the asset (bond)
markets and decide how to allocate the resulting money holdings between pre-
cautionary balances (z lQ > 0) to be used at date 1 and transactions balances.
These latter balances are then used to purchase their commodity bundles from
the central exchange. The same sequence is repeated in each state 5 at date 1,
except that in the second subperiod assets pay dividends and the precaution-
ary balances are liquidated to finance the commodity purchases in the third
subperiod.
The central exchange is run by the government which injects an amount
of money M = (Mo, Mi, . .
.
,Ms) in the first subperiod of each state (s =
0, 1, . .
.
, 5) in exchange for the endowments. The statement that the transac-
tions demand for money equals the supply in each state gives rise to a system
of monetary equations
/
£p,.i-l=M/„ 5 = 0,1 5 (43)
1=1
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akin to the quantity theory equations. The vector of velocities of circulation
v = (t>o, . .
.
, vs) is endogenously determined and depends on the precautionary
holdings (z l
,
. .
.
, Zq) of the agents. A monetary equilibrium is then essentially
a nominal asset equilibrium to which are added the monetary equations (43).
It is the latter system of equations which "closes" the model and enables the
purchasing power of money to be endogenously determined.
How does the Walrasian test of counting nonredundant equations and un-
knowns apply to the concept of a monetary equilibrium? Briefly, excess demand
on the spot and asset markets leads to a system of equations akin to (36). To
this are adjoined the 5 + 1 monetary equations (43). Since equation (35) con-
tinues to be valid there are still 5+1 Walras' Laws. However the addition of
the monetary equations (43) implies that there is now no homogeneity property
in the prices. The 5 + 1 equations (43) thus exactly compensate for the equa-
tions missing by virtue of the 5 + 1 Walras' Laws. We would thus expect that
generically there are a finite number of monetary equilibria (as is confirmed by
the analysis of Magill-Quinzii).
The analysis of the agents precautionary demands for money is facilitated
if it is assumed that (1, . .
.
, 1) G (N) or that the first asset is a riskless bond
N 1 = (1, . .
.
, 1). Its price then satisfies q\ = jz^r where r\ is the riskless rate
of interest. With this assumption it can be shown that generically there are two
types of equilibria: those in which ri > and v = (1, . .
.
, 1) and those in which
rj = and v ^ (1,...,1). In what follows we concentrate on a qualitative
statement for the positive interest rate equilibria: in these the precautionary
demand for money is zero since money is dominated by the riskless bond as a
store of value.
For fixed N we let the economy be parametrised by the endowments and
money supply
(uj,M)enxM
,
m = R++ !
To factor out those monetary changes which are neutral, in a neighborhood
Mjj- of a monetary policy M G M we define the induced 5 — 1 dimensional
neighborhood
Mjg= \m e Mjr
I
M = Mo, J2 Ma = fl, 1 (44)
The following result regarding the neutrality or non-neutrality of monetary
5S
policy can then be derived (see Magill-Quinzii (1988)).
Theorem 20. Let Assumption 1 hold. There is a generic set A C ft x M
for which the monetary equilibria of the economy £(u>, M\ N) are regular.
(a) If rank N = S any positive interest rate equilibrium allocation x(u>, M)
with (u>, M) (E A satisfies x(u, M) = x(u, M) for allM in a neighborhood
ofM.
(b) If(i) (1, . .
.
, 1) € (N) (ii) < J < S (Hi) I > J (iv) N is in
general position, for any positive interest rate equilibrium allocation x(u>, M)
with (a), M) £ A there is an S — 1 dimensional neighborhood Mjft ofM (defined
as in (44)) such that the image of the equilibrium allocation map x(u>, •) :
Mm — Rn is a submanifold of JRn of dimension 5—1.
Remark. This result is closely related to the policy effectiveness debate of
Sargent-Wallace (1975) and Fischer (1977). Theorem 20(a) may be viewed as a
general equilibrium version of the Sargent-Wallace neutrality proposition: with
rational expectations monetary policy is locally neutral if (i) asset markets are
complete and (ii) the velocity of circulation of money is locally independent of
M. Theorem 20(b) can be viewed as a general equilibrium version of the Fischer
critique: with rational expectations if (i) asset markets are incomplete and (ii)
nominal asset returns and the velocity of circulation are locally independent of
M, then generically monetary policy has real effects. Of course for some types
of contracts it may not be realistic to assume that nominal returns are fixed
independently of anticipated monetary policy.
Remark. An important condition required for the validity of theorems 19
and 20 is that there be sufficient diversity among agents in the economy. This
diversity is twofold. First there must be enough agents (/ > J). Second the
agents must be distinct - more precisely genericity conditions are made to ensure
that the agents have distinct endowments and hence distinct income profiles.
The fact that the arguments depend in an essential way on diversity among
the agents places these results in sharp contrast with an important strand of
modern macroeconomics which is based on models of equilibrium with a single
representative agent. The redistributive income effects that lie behind the real
effects of money supply changes are necessarily absent in all representative agent
economies.
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4. Production and the Stock Market
In the previous sections we have shown how the traditional (GE) theory of
an exchange economy can be extended to the frameweok of incomplete markets
(GEI). The key feature in this transition is a change of emphasis from reliance on
a system of markets for real goods to a division of roles between spot markets
for allocating real goods and financial markets for redistributing income and
sharing risks. Thus while GE theory views the economy as consisting solely of
a real sector, the GEI theory provides a symmetric role for the real and financial
sectors of the economy.
How is the traditional GE theory altered when we move to a prodution
economy? What new phenomena enter? Is the resulting theory satisfactory?
It will become clear in attempting to answer these questions that developing a
satisfactory GEI theory of a production economy presents much greater chal-
lenges.
Two-period production economy. We consider the simplest model of a
production economy with time and uncertainty. To this end we adjoin to the
exchange economy £{u,u) of section 2.1 a finite number of firms j = 1, . .
.
, J
each characterised by a production set YJ C Rn and an initial endowment vec-
tor rj J £ Rn . Each firm chooses a production plan yJ £ Y J , yJ = (y } , y[ , . . . , y Js )
where y Js = (y^,...,y^) denotes the vector of goods produced in state 6: if
Vat < (> 0) then good I is used in state s as an input (is produced in state as
an output). The technical conditions that we imposed on the agent's charac-
teristics (u,u>) in section 2.1 are those that lead to a smooth exchange economy.
The technical conditions that we now add regarding the firms' characteristics
(Y J
,
rj3 ) are those that lead to a smooth production economy. The reader should
not be upset if these conditions seam a little tricky to express: the role of each
assumption is in fact straightforward.
Fundamentally the production sets Y 3 should be like the standard convex
productions sets of GE. However, to be able to use the machinery of differen-
tial topology in the qualitative analysis of equilibrium we need two additional
properties:
(a) each production set Y3 has a smooth boundary dY1
GO
(b) a convenient way of parametrising the decisions of firms.
So that (a) does not imply that the production set Y3 involves all commodi-
ties, we say that Y 3 is a full-dimensional submanifold of a linear subspace
E3 C Rn . However EJ cannot be an arbitrary subspace of Rn — it should
involve some activity in each state (i.e. for any non-trivial production plan y3 ,
in each state some good is input or output). The initial endowments t}3 are
introduced to obtain property (b). So as not to be arbitrary, they should be
compatible with the production sets Y 3 in the sense of lying in the subspace
E-'. Finally the production sets Y = (Y l ,.. . ,Y ) and endowment vectors
(a;, 77) = (u 1 ,. . .u) 1 ,7]* ,. . . ,r) J ) must be related in such a way that it is not
possible to produce an arbitrarily large amount of any commodity (aggegate
output is bounded). More formally
Assumption 2. (Firm characteristics) (1) Y3 C Rn is closed, convex and
6 Y 3 . (2) There exist linear subspaces E3 C RL ,s = 0,1,..., S with
dim(.E^) > such that Y 3 is a full-dimensional submanifold (with boundary) of
E3 = Eq x Ei x ... x Es- (3) Y 3 satisfies free disposal relative to E3 . (4)
The boundary dY 3 is a C2 manifold with strictly positive Gaussian curvature
at each point. (5) There is a non-empty open set O C Rn ^ /+ * such that if
we define
n =
(
r;'+ x ]T E3 \ n o
then ZUi w'+Ei-i Vj e RU, V(W , 17) 6 and (zLi «'" + E/=i(^ J' + Vj ))
n RJ is compact V (a;, 77) G fi.
To complete the description of the production economy we need a state-
ment about the way the ownership of the J firms is distributed among the /
consumers. Let
c
l C 1
c =
ci ... ci
denote the matrix of initial ownership shares where Q is the ownership share
of agent i in firm j. We assume
CeRi7 , X)Cj = i, i = i J (45)
1=1
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If the agents' characteristics (u,u>) satisfy Assumption 1, firms' characteristics
(K, 77) satisfy Assumption 2 and the ownership shares C satisfy (45) then we ob-
tain a production economy £(u,Y,£]u,n) which forms the basis for the analysis
follows. Whenever generic argmuments are needed we parametrise the economy
by the initial endowments
(a;,r
7)Gfi= [ RJ7+ X ] >>" ] n O
An allocation (x, y) = (x 1 , . . . , x , y 1 , . . . y J ) for the economy £(u, y, £; u>, 77)
is a vector of consumption x' G R" for each consumer (i — 1,..., J) and a
production plan y3 € V-7 for each firm (j = I,... J). Equilibrium theory can
be viewed as the qualitative study of the allocations that arise when we adjoin
different market structures to the production economy £(u,Y,£',u,t]). As in
the earlier sections we study two such market structures, that of classical GE
(contingent markets) and that of GEI (spot-security markets).
Contingent markets (GE). Contingent commodities and the vector of
contingent prices P G Rn were defined in section 2.1. Let
V =
Vo • • • Vo
n
y\ ... vi
Vs • Vs J
denote the L(S+l) x J matrix whose columns are the J firms production plans.
With contingent markets agent z's (GE) budget set becomes
B(P, y, ry, C'V) = {*'' G Rn+ I P(x i - w« - (y + rj)C) = 0}
The shareholders of each firm j (j = 1, ... J) are unanimous that the firm acts
in their best interests (and more generally of all consumers) if it maximises the
present value of its profit P • y J over its production set Y 3 . This leads to the
following concept of equilibrium.
Definition 10. A contingent market (CM) equilibrium for the economy
^(u, y, C;u?, r;) is a pair of actions and prices ((z, y),P) such that
(i) x', z = l,...,7 satisfy x l = arg max u'(x')
x
l eB{P,y,ih i\u l )
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(ii) y
3\ j = 1,. . . , J satisfy y3 = arg max P y3
y
1' e Y 3
I J
We also refer to such an equilibrium as a GE equilibrium.
Stock-Market (GEI). As we mentioned before, a system of contingent
markets is not the type of market structure that we observe in an actual econ-
omy: it should be viewed as an ideal system of markets. A more realistic
market structure is obtained by splitting the allocative role of markets between
a system of real spot markets on the one hand and a system of financial mar-
kets on the other. In this section we restrict ourselves to the simplest class of
financial contracts which allows us to describe the functioning of the GEI model
of a production economy. We assume that the J financial assets consist of the
J securities issued by the firms in which the agents hold the initial ownership
shares defined by the matrix £. Real assets such as futures contracts can be
included at the cost of some complication in the notation. A proper treatment
of nominal assets such as bonds calls for an analysis along the lines of section
3.2.
We arrive however at an awkward problem of modelling. If we look out
at the real world where time and uncertainly enter in an essential way then
we must recognise two facts: first, in terms of the risks faced and the resources
and ability to pay in all circumstances there are substantial differences between
(small) individual consumers and (large) shareholder owned firms: thus loans
will not be granted anonymously. Second, in practice not all consumers and
firms deliver on their contracts in all contingencies: there is frequently default.
The highly idealised model that we consider below abstracts from these
two crucial difficulties. Since we assume that consumers and firms have equal
access to the financial markets and since there is no default, under general
assumptions regarding the behaviour of firms, the equilibrium allocations that
emerge do not depend on the financial policies chosen by the firms. In short, to
obtain determinate financial policies which influence the equilibrium allocation
further imperfections need to be introduced.
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Since modelling necessarily proceeds by steps, let us try to make this clear.
Let D 3 = (D J ,D\,. . . ,D 3S )T denote the vector of dividends paid by firm j
(where D 3Q is paid after the security has been purchased) and let qj denote
its market price (j = 1,...,J). We allow all firms free access to the equity
markets. This means that each firm can buy and sell the securities of all firms
as it wants. Suppose firm j has chosen its production plan y3 and its vector of
ownership shares in all firms £ J = (£j , . . . , f j) EE . If we define the matrix of
stock market returns
W(q,D) = D -qD 1
[D l - qi
D ls
then each firm's dividend stream D 3 satisfies
D JQ - qj
Di
(46)
D3 =pu (y 3 + rj j ) -r W(q, D)£> t j = 1, . . . , J (47)
If we define the matrix of inter-firm shareholdings
'«} ••• tf'
.6 •• ii.
then the system of linear equations (47) can be solved to give
C =
D=[pa(y + rj)- qi
o
[i-Z\ -i (48)
provided the matrix (/ — £) is nonsingular (a sufficient condition is £ J £ R+ ,
13t=i w < 1» j = 1, . . . , J). (48) expresses the fact that when firms are
allowed to buy and sell shares in other firms then the dividends D 3 of firm j de-
pend not only its own prodution-portfolio decision (y-? ,£ J ) but on the production-
portfolio decisions of all firms (y,£)-
Given the expression (48) for the dividends, the budget sets of the con-
sumers can be defined. If agent i begins with the initial portfolio of ownership
shares in the J firms £' = (£{, . . . , £j) and z l — (zj, .. . , z'j) £ R.*
7 denotes the
new portfolio purchased, then his budget set is given by
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S(P,?,ZU>') = {:r'€R; 3 z
i
e RJsuch that
p (*•' -u i ) = qCeQ + Wz i
where e = (1 , 0, . . . , 0) 6 R5+1 . The following preliminary concept of equilibri-
um describes how the stock market values the plans (y,£) = (y1 , . . . , y , f 1 , • • • i f )
chosen by the firms.
Definition 11. A stock-market equilibrium with fixed producer plans (y,£)
is a pair ((x, 2), (p, <?); (y, f )) such that
(i) (x',2'), i = l,...,J satisfy
x' = arg max u'(x'), p n(i' -w') = <7C' eo + Wz l
B(p,q,D,C,u')
(") (y ; ,^), i = l,...,J satisfy
(a) y J G V' J (b) (/-£) is invertible
/ J
(m) x>*
- w ') = D^' +V)
.=1 >=i
( iv ) E 2"' + E^ = e ' e = (i,...,i)6RJ
t=l ;=1
The following result shows that the equilibrium allocations x and the equilib-
rium prices (p, q) are independent of the firms financial policies £.
Proposition 21. If ((x, c), (p, q); (y,£)) JS a stocA* market equilibrium with
fixed producer plans (y,£) fhen ((x, 5),(p, 9); (y,0) IS a s ^oc^ market equilib-
rium with fixed producer plans (y, £) where z = (I — £)(/ — £)
-1
^.
Proof. Consider the induced exchange economy £(u, lj; A) with real asset
structure A = [yi + ?/i] where agent Vs endowment is given by ^, = u\ +
(y» + »7*)C'i* = 0,l,...,5,i = 1,...,/. If ((x, 0), (p.q)) is an FM equilibrium
C5
for £(u,u>;A) then ((x,2),(p, q)) is an equilibrium with fixed producer plans
where
qJ = Poyt + qj , r = [/-ZW + C)
The proof then follows from the fact that £(u,u;A) is independent of f.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 can readily be extended to the case where firms and con-
sumers have access to K other real securities in zero net supply characterised
by an 5 x K date 1 returns matrix R\. In this more general setting Proposition
21 is in essence the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. In particular if we let borrowing
and lending be denoted by the numeraire asset which pays one unit of good 1
in each state at date 1 then we obtain the Modigliani-Miller -proposition on the
irrelevance of debt financing.
Note that if we impose short- sales constraints on agents (z* G R+) then
the market values q may depend on the choice of financial policies £ : for even if
d l +C E R+ , the matrix [I — f] will not in general map R+ into R+ . Similarily
if we allow firms to have access to financial policies which alter the span of the
financial markets then the market values q will be influenced by their financial
policies £.
Firms Objective Functions. The above analysis suggests that there is a
broad class of models, where even when markets are incomplete, while con-
sumers view their own choices of portfolios z as being of great importance, as
shareholders of the firms they do not view the firms' choices of financial policies
as important. The choice of particular financial policies by firms is simply a
matter of packaging: since consumers and firms have access to the same sub-
space of income transfers (W), a consumer can always repackage the income
streams offered by firms. As shareholders however, the consumers view firms'
choices of production plans (y) as a decision of great importance. Do the spot
and equity markets provide firms with enough price information to be able to de-
duce what the approriate objective functions should be for making their choices
of production plans?
In the analysis that follows we restrict ourselves to the class of linear objec-
tive funtions. Since there are spot markets available in each state and since the
spot prices pa guide the firms decision within a state, the problem of determin-
m
ing an objective funtion for firm j reduces to determining the relative prices to
be assigned to the states, namely the choice of a vector of present value prices
^' = (i,^',...,^)6Rfi 1 , ; = i,...,j
Suppose for the moment that (53 has been determined.
We assume that firm j's manager chooses the production financing decision
(yJ >fJ ) £ Y 1' x R -7 which maximises the present value of its dividend stream
s
?Di
= Y,tiDi> i-i.— .' (49 )
3=
given the production-financing decisions (y ,f ) of all other firms k ^ j. Since
the dividend stream D 3 satisfies (47) we can write (49) as
jD j = ? {p a (y> + r,')) + 0>W(q, D)t\ j = 1, . . . , J
Suppose JW ^ then there exists a sequence of portfolios ££ such that
j3 JDJ —> ooasi/ — oo. Thus a necessary condition for each objective function
(49) to attain a maximum is that (3J £
-^++
1
satisfy
pjw = o <=> /3j e (iy)-L nRf+ 1 , ;=1,...,J (50)
so that (3 ] is a positive supporting state price to the attainable set (W). But
when this property holds
^>"=^'.(P n(?>^)), ; = l,...,J
the present value of firm j's dividend stream equals the present value of its
profit. Thus with an objective function satisfying (49) and (50) firm j chooses
its production plan y J to maximise the present value of its profit and its fi-
nancial policy £ ; is irrelevant. (The fact that each firms' objective function
is independent of its financial policy can be viewed as the second part of the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem. The first part being given by Proposition 21.)
With an objective function of the form (49) assigned to each firm the
GEI model becomes closed. Since each firm has a criterion for evaluating its
production-financing decision (y J ,£ } ) the concept of a stock market equilibrium
with fixed producer plans (y,£) can be replaced by the follwing concept.
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Definition 12. A stock-market equilibrium for the economy £(u, Y, £;cj, 77) is
a pair ((x, z), (y, £), (p, q)) such that the conditions of definition 11 are satisfied
with (ii)(a) replaced by
(ii)(a)': there exist j G R++ 1 satisfiying (50) such that
y
J
=argmaxj3; '(pDyJ ), ; = 1,...,J (51)
y
j e Yj
Generically Complete Stock Market (J > S). In the context of def-
inition 12 the GEI "theory of the firm" is reduced to a theory of how (3J
is determined Consider the simplest case first where there are enough pub-
licly traded firms for their equity contracts to span all possible contingencies
(J > S). In this case for generic (u>,J?) £ ft, for any stock market equilbrium,
rank pi (y"i + rji) = S. Since the equilibrium does not depend on £ we can
set f = 0. Thus
&W=-0 <=> 0i(j>i (yi+r?1 ))=9-poyo, j = l,...,J (52)
has a unique (normalised) solution
F = (iJi) = (i t *i)***, i = i J (53)
PVii/t a complete stock market each firm can deduce its vector of present value
prices /33 = ft from a knowledge of the spot and equity prices (p,q) and the
outputs (y -f 77) of all firms (or more generally the dividend policies D defined
by (48)). Since each consumer's present value vector ff' satisfies (52) we obtain
equality of the present value vectors of all consumers and firms
*»"
= £> = *, £=1 /, j=l J (54)
The first order conditions for consumers and firms on the spot markets then
imply that their gradients satisfy
fp-W.u^ff npeNyidY\ t = l,...,i\i = l,...,J (55)
where NgjdYJ denotes the set of normal vectors to the boundary BY1 at y3 .
(55) are the standard first order necessary conditions for Pareto optimality,
which in view of Assumpitons 1 and 2 are also sufficient.
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The analysis of section 2.2A can be extended to the production economy
£(u,Y, £,u>,tj). Let Ec(w,rf) denote the set of contingent market equilbrium al-
locations and let JE,y(a;,Ty) denote the set of stock market equilibrium allocations
then the following result can be established (see theorem 5).
Theorem 22. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and if J > S then there exists
a generic set 0.* C ft such that
JSy(u;,r/) = Ec(u;,77), V (u;,*?) € ft*
There are a positive finite number of stock market equilibria each of which is
Pareto optimal and locally a smooth function of the parameters (u, rj).
Remark. Three additional properties of the stock market equilibria of theo-
rem 22 should be noted. Since
q = zD <=!> q = f • (p (y + *?))
each firm maximises its market value under the standard competitive assump-
tion that firms ignore the effect of changes in their production decisions on
the prices (jf,/?). Since f % = 7f,z = 1,...,/ all shareholders (and consumers)
unanimously approve the production decisions y taken by the firms. Since the
stock market and contingent market equilibrium allocations coincide, the stock
market allocations do not depend on the financial policies £ chosen by the firms
(which are therefore indeterminate).
Partial Spanning. For simplicity we express the idea that follows for the
case of a one good economy (L = 1). We say that the technology sets and
initial endowments ( Y, 77) satisfy partial spanning if there exists a linear subspace
ZcE +1 of dimension A' < J such that
Yj cZ, nJ ez, ; = i,...,J
If this condition is satisfied then generically in any stock market equilibrium
(y + l) = %• For any firm j, any alternative production y J G V-7 can be priced
by no-arbitrage since this output is a combination of the outputs of all firms
(securities) which are already priced in the market. Thus if y J = £) fc_j dky
k
then the objective funtion (51) is defined by
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Thus if the technology sets and initial endowments (Y,tj) satisfy partial spanning
then even if the markets are incomplete (J < S) the firms' objective funtions
(51) are generically uniquely defined by the stock market. Furthermore it can be
shown that generically the shareholders unanimously approve the production
decisions y of the firms.
Incomplete Stock Market (J < S). When the condition of partial spanning
is not satisfied, in any stock market equilbrium each firm j will typically have
access to dividend streams D3 satisfying
D{ i (Dl )
by changing its production plan. An incomplete stock market equilibrium differs
in two important respects from the complete and partial spanning stock market
equilibria.
(1) With an incomplete stock market the set of normalised solutions of (52)
is an affine subspace of dimension S — J > 0. The firms can therefore
not use market observations on prices and dividends {q,D) to determine
their present value vectors 3
. Some extra-market information must be
used to determine j33 .
(ii) Whatever (3 3 vector is chosen, generically for all shareholders ff' ^ (3 3 .
Shareholders will thus disagree with the production plan y3 chosen by the
firm.
In an incomplete stock market the decision problem faced by the manager of
a firm is essentially a public goods problem for its constituency of shareholders.
In view of (ii) whenever a firm's technology set permits it to consider production
plans which lie outside the current span of the markets, the firm's manager
cannot expect to obtain unanimous support for his choice of production plan.
A standard way of resolving a problem of public choice when unanimity cannot
be expected is to resort to the Hicks- Kaldor criterion. Let us see if applying
this criterion can lead to a resolution of the firm's decision problem.
Let ((x, i), (y, £)»(/>> 4)) be a stock market equilibrium. Suppose the man-
ager of firm j envisions a change in the firms's production plan
yj > yJ + dtj>
This changed production plan alters the equity contract that the firm places on
the market. Suppose all agents have competitive perceptions in the sense that
dp = 0, dqk = 0, k ^ j
The basic premise of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is that the marginal utility of
one unit of good 1 at date is to be assigned the same value for all share
holders. The idea that the gains of the winners (resulting from the change dyJ )
can be used to compensate the losers by means of a system of transfers at date
leads to the following criterion: the change dyJ £ TyjdY3 is to be accepted
(rejected) if £f=1 (x) du { > (< 0).
Let (dqjY denote agent i's perception of the change in the security price
arising from the changed dividend stream dy 1 . From agent i's budget constraints
(Ai)'Kj " *j) +Pody3 z) + (po(y -r Vo) ~ q)dz {
(Pi a dy{)z
l
+pi(yi +Tn)dz l
p a dx x =
Since (~
J
da* = ( ^-
J
(Di:u i)dx i = (-' p)dx* = t 1 • (p a dx { ) and since
q = ff' • (p a (y + ?/)) we obtain
(jj) du> = (dqs)\q - z)) + r (p a dyi)z), i = 1, . . . , I
Suppose agents perceptions are competitive in the sense that the security price
is assumed to adjust to the changed dividend stream, the present value of the
changed dividend stream being evaluated with agent f s personal present value
vector 7f', then
(dqj y-ir'(p a cfy'") = 0, i = l /
so that the Hicks-Kaldor sum reduces to
1=1 N 0/ 1=1 i=l
This criterion, which was proposed by Grossman-Hart (1979), is equivalent to
the firm having a criterion of the form (51) with present value vector (3> defined
by
i = ]Ccj*\ i = l J (56)
1=1
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E (v) dui = D^)'ti = E^ (p a w)
We can argue that this case would seem natural :/ the shareholders are per-
ceived as monitoring the managers production decision "before" the stock mar-
ket meets.
On the other hand :/ the shareholders are perceived as monitoring the man-
agers decision "after" the stock market meets then
(%)'= 0, t = l I
since with no further security trading there can be no change in the equity's
price. In this case the Hicks-Kaldor sum reduces to
This criterion, which was proposed by Dreze (1974), is equivalent to the firm
having a present value vector 3 given by
^ = E^'> i = 1 JT (57)
Since it is not economically meaningful to give negative weight to agents holding
a short position in firm j, Dreze suggested that all agents be restricted to holding
long positions in the equity contracts.
Definition 13. A stock market equilibrium ((x, z), (y, f), (p, q)) in which
3 = Yli=i Cj^'ii = 1,..., J is called a Grossman-Hart equilibrium. If firms do
not hold equity portfolios (£ = 0), if consumers are restricted to non-negative
equity portfolios (z £ H+; ) and if fl 3 = £3i=i ^}^*>i = 1, - • • , «/ then a stock
market equilibrium ((x,z),(y,0),(p, q)) is called a Dreze equilibrium.
A Grossman-Hart equilibrium does not always exist. We have however the
following result ensuring the consistency of this equilibrium concept.
Theorem 23. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there is a generic set fi' Cfi
such that for all (w, 77) £ Q' there is a positive finite number of Grossman-Hart
equilibria, each of which is locally a smooth function of (a;, 77).
Remark. A similar result can be established for Dreze equilibria. The Gross-
man-Hart concept has the important property that it extends naturally to
framework of a stochastic production economy. The reader can readily spell
out the details using the framework developed in section 2.3. As pointed out
by Grossman-Hart (1979) the Dreze concept encounters problems in the multi-
period case.
For the two firm criteria denned by (56) and (57) the "extra-market in-
formation" referred to in (i) that is required to obtain a well-defined criterion
(i.e. a determinate ft vector for each firm) is obtained from the shareholders
of the firm. Both these criteria can thus be viewed as formalisations of the idea
that ownership implies control. The competitive assumption that underlies the
model however precludes shareholders from acting strategically in their pur-
chase of firms securities. This is clearly a weakness of the model since there are
important situations where it is most unrealistic to assume that shareholders
do not take into account the effect that their security purchases will have on
firms' production decisions.
Market Value Maximisation. All the preceeding analysis has been based
on the competitive assumption that consumers and firms do not take into ac-
count the effect of their commodity-portfolio decisions on the market prices
(p, q). For consumers this seems a reasonable approximation since they are nor-
mally one of many buyers (sellers) on the commodity and security markets
(modulo the proviso made above). For firms on the commodity markets where
they are one of many buyers and sellers this may also yield a useful first approx-
imation. But for firms on the equity markets the situation is quite different:
since the firm is the sole supplier of its equity contract it can be argued that the
firm should act strategically with regard to the equity contract that it markets.
We are thus led to a monopolistic concept of equilibrium which for sim-
plicity we express for the case of a one good economy (L = 1) in which f = 0.
Let ((£, z),q~',y) denote a stock market equilibrium with fixed producer
plans y for the economy £(u,Y, £;u>,t]) and let (y,u,fj) be a regular parameter
value. Laying aside the difficulties posed by multiple equilibria (and proceeding
informally), for each y in a neighborhood of y the market value q{y) is well-
defined. In order for ((x, z), </(•); y) to be a market value maximising equilibrium
each firms production plan 7/J must maximise its market value q } (y-*, y~ J ) given
the production plans j/
-
-' = (y
k
) klij for all other firms. To our knowledge there
is at present no theorem asserting the existence of such an equilibrium. Hart
(1979) however has studied this concept and has argued that under assumptions
ensuring that each firm is "negligible", shareholders will agree that market value
maximisation is in their best interests.
Is it possible to define a competitive version of the above concept of equi-
librium? Suppose firms make conjectures about the way the market values a
dividend stream i.e. they conjecture a present value vector /?J € R . If we
require that firms have common conjectures then we are led to the following
concept of equilbirum.
Definition 14. A stock market equilibrium in which ft3 = /3,j = 1, . . . , J is
called a competitive market value maximising equilibirum.
Such equilibria exist generically, but are indeterminate.
Theorem 24. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and if J < S then there is a
generic set Q,' C £1 such that for all (u>,rj) £ Q' the set of competitive market
value maximising equilibrium allocations contains a set homeomorhpic to a baii
m RS~ J .
Remark. It is clear from the analysis of this section that the problem of for-
mulating a consistent and satisfactory concept of equilibrium presents much
greater challenges for a GEI production economy than for the GEI exchange
economy analysed in sections 2 and 3. In the section that follows we shall exam-
ine the efficiency properties of these GEI exchange and production equilibria.
References. The classic paper on stock market equilibrium with incomplete
markets is due to Diamond (1967), who also proves a version of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem. The concept of partial spanning was introduced by Ekern-
Wilson (1974) and further analysed by Radner (1974). It was Dreze (1974)
who first understood the public goods nature of the firms decision problem
when partial spanning no longer holds. He introduced the objective funtion
defined by (57) and analysed the resulting concept of equilibrium (including
existence). Grossman-Hart (1979) presented a systematic critique of the con-
cept of a stock market equilibrium and introduced the criterion (56) which
seems to offer a wider domain of applicability. A classic general equilibrium
version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem was presented by Stiglitz (1974): it
was extended to a wider array of assets and to the case of inter-firm share-
holdings by Duffie-Shafcr (19S6b) and DeMarzo (19SSa). Theorem 22 is due to
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Duffie-Shafer (1986b). Theorem 23 is a special case of a more general result on
the existence of a monetary equilibrium (i.e. an extension of the equilibrium of
section 3.2) for a production economy given by Magill-Quinzii (1989). Theorem
24 is due to Duffie-Shafer (19S6b).
5. Efficiency Properties of Markets
Under what conditions does a market system function satisfactorily? This
question is given a precise answer by two basic theorems of GE under the as-
sumptions of convexity of preferences and technology sets, absence of external-
ities, common information and price taking behaviour. The Existence theorem
and the First Welfare theorem assert that a GE market system "works" in the
sense that for all economies
(i) it has a solution (existence)
(ii) the resulting solution is unimprovable (Pareto optimal).
A GEI market system works at least in the preliminary sense that (i) holds
generically (theorem 9). (ii) however is generically not satisfied: GEI allocations
are not Pareto optimal (theorem 10). Should this inefficiency property of GEI
markets lead us to conclude that the GEI system is inadequate for solving the
problem of resource allocation? It is clear that whenever a system of markets is
incomplete the criterion of Pareto optimality is too demanding. Is there a less
demanding criterion which respects the intrinsic incompleteness of the markets
with respect to which the GEI system can be judged as satisfactory? We will
consider this question within the framework of an exchange economy and then
within the framework of a production (stock market) economy.
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5.1 Inefficiency in Exchange
To simplify the analysis we assume that the financial contracts consist
solely of the class that we have called real assets. We have therefore as the
initial data an exchange economy £{u,u);A) with real asset structure A. We
are interested in analysing the efficiency properties of the GEI equilibria of this
economy. To this end it is important to understand the following property of
a real asset contract. The purchaser (seller) of one unit of real asset j can take
(make) delivery in state s at date 1 in one of two forms:
(a) as the bundle of goods A{ £ Ft or
(b) as the income value p3 • A{ E R. of this bundle of goods.
If the commodity bundle AJ3 can be sold (purchased) freely on the spot markets
at the price p s or if there is only one good (L = 1), then each agent is indifferent
between these two modes of delivery. In a GEI equlibrium, in view of the way
they enter agents budget sets, real assets are taken as financial instruments for
redistributing income across the states: agents are thus viewed as accepting
(making) delivery in the manner (b). If for some reason the bundles A{ cannot
always be freely traded on the spot markets then the manner (a) of accepting
(making) delivery makes the real asset contract much more restrictive. In the
analysis that follows we shall see that real assets have a (weak) constrained
efficiency property if and only if they are interpreted as goods delivery contracts
(a). When agent i buys the portfolio z' = (zj,...,2j) of the real assets then
under the bundle of goods mode of delivery (a) he receives the bundle of goods
J
at date 1. We are thus led to the following definition. (Notation: for x' (=
Rn,x^ e H L let [(x'Js^ixl] e Rn denote the vector which coincides with x'
except for the component cr which is x xa .)
Definition 15. Let £w(u) denote an economy with utility functions u =
(u 1 ,. . ., u 1 ) and total resources w = (u' ,u>i,..., ws) 6 1R-++ • -^n allocation
x = (x 1 ,...,.^) is weakly constrained (WC) efficient for €w(u) if (i) 5Z,=1 x'3 =
w s , $ = 0,1,..., S (ii) for each state cr = 0, 1, . .
.
, 5 there does not exist
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an alternative allocation xa = (xj,, . . . ,x£) satisfying J3i«i x * = ">* such that
«'"([(*iWr,*i]) >«•(*'). * = i,...,/
(iii) there do not exist transfers of goods at date 0, r = (f(J,. . • ,7q ) £ R
with X^i=i rd = an<^ changes in the portfolios £ = (f
1
,...,^
7
) € E. with
£?=i £' = ° such that
u'*(4 + 4, x[ + A£*") > u'Cx'), i = 1, • • • , /
The following result due to Grossman (1977) shows why the concept of WC
efficiency is of interest.
Theorem 25. (i) If ((x, 2), (p, q)) is a GEI equilibrium then the allocation
x is weakly constrained efficient.
(ii) If the allocation x is weakly constrained efficient for the economy £w (u)
and if x 6 R++ then there exist a distribution of the goods (u; 1 , . . . ,w 7 )
with Ef-jW 1 = w, portfolios z = (z 1 ,...,!7 ) and prices (p,q) such that
((x, z ), (p, q)) is a GEI equilibrium.
Remark. Theorem 25 gives a characterisation of the efficiency properties sat-
isfied by GEI equilibria. For the case of an exchange economy with one good
(L = 1) it provides a natural extension of the two Welfare theorems to the
case of incomplete markets when the concept of weak constrained efficiency is
used instead of Pareto efficiency. However when there are two or more goods
(L > 2) the theorem does not have such a natural interpretation, since it does
not resolve the basic question of whether or not GEI markets are "efficient".
First, the WC concept does not deal properly with the case where the
asset structure A is regular (the case of potentially complete markets) for in
this case the GEI equilibrium allocations are generically (fully) Pareto efficient
(theorem 3). The definition of WC coincides with (full) Pareto efficiency only
when A has column rank SL; when L > 2 this requires J > SL rather than
J > S for regularity. Furthermore by insisting on a concept of efficiency which
holds not generically but for all economies (i.e. all u E 0.) one is forced to
make the concept sufficiently weak so that it applies to economies Q £ Q which
have equilibria that can be Pareto ordered (as in example 5 of Hart mentioned
above).
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Second, when the asset structure A is not regular (so that the markets are
incomplete) we should stop looking for efficiency properties which hold for all
equilibria of generic economies. Hart (1975) has given a robust example of an
economy in which A is not regular in which there are equilibria which can be
Pareto ordered. For such economies, even if one has a notion of efficiency which
is only required to hold generically it must be sufficiently weak to permit the
Pareto dominated equilibrium to be efficient. When markets are incomplete
the focus should shift towards better understanding why GEI equilibria are
inefficient.
To understand the reason why financial markets are inefficient it is helpful
to examine the concept of WC efficiency in definition 15 more carefully. Con-
sider condition (iii): when the portfolios are reallocated z — z + £ agents are
not allowed to retrade on the spot markets, they must accept physical deliv-
ery of the entire bundle of date 1 goods implied by their changed asset position
Af. Thus while in the equilibrium the assets are treated as instruments for
allocating income, for the reallocation they are treated as instruments for de-
livering bundles of goods. The reason is clear: if as a result of the portfolio
changes, agents are permitted to retrade on the spot markets, then spot prices
will change. This spillover effect from financial markets to the spot markets is
precisely the effect that the next concept of constrained efficiency seeks to cap-
ture. Note of course that in an economy with only one good (L = 1) there is
no spillover effect to consider since there are no spot markets (spot prices).
In creating a concept of efficiency it is useful to introduce the idea of a
fictional planner. The planner is viewed as having access to certain "feasible
allocations": if by choosing one of these he can make agents better off then we
say that the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. The problem is thus reduced
to defining the "feasible allocations": choosing the standard set leads to the
concept of Pareto optimality — but with incomplete markets this concept is
irrelevant: we are giving the planner much more freedom to allocate resources
across states than is provided by the system of spot and financial markets.
For an economy with two or more goods the appropriate concept has been
introduced by Stiglitz (19S2) and extended to the GEI model by Geanakoplos-
Polemarchakjs (19S6).The key idea is to subject the planner to constraints which
mimic those implicit in the system of financial markets. The planner can thus
choose a pair (7', z l ) consisting of a fee 7
1 (payable at date 0) and a portfolio z*
7S
for each agent i = 1,...,/. The consumption allocation z = (x1 ,...,ar) is then
determined through spot markets at an appropriate market clearing price (p).
If (7,2) = (7
1
,...7
/
,2
1
,...,z
/
) then we define the feasible plans ((7,z),(z,p)) as
follows.
Definition 16. A plan ((7, z),(x,p)) is constrained feasible for the exchange
economy S(u,u\ A) if
(i) E7'=0 (ii) E:' =
(iii) (x,p) satisfy ^(z 1 — u; ,)=0
i=l
x
x
= arg max t/'(z'), t = 1, ..., /
subject to p (*o ~ wo) = ~l' Po eoi , e i = (1,...,0) G R
Pi a(x{ -u[) = p1Az i
A plan ((7, z),(z,p)) is constrained efficient if it is constrained feasible
and there does not exist a constrained feasible plan ((7, z),(z,p)) such that
u^x') > u^x 1 ), i = 1,...,/.
Remark. For convenience we assume that the fee is paid in units of good 1.
If we define the virtual endowments
u l =(«} -7'eoi, w[+Az l ) , i = 1,...,J
then in (iii), (z, p) is an equilibriiun of the (virtual) exchange economy £{u, u ).
Note also that if ((z, 2), (p, q)) is a GEI equilibrium then ((7, f), (z,p)) with
7 = q(z l ,...,2 ) is a constrained feasible plan.
In the one good case constrained efficiency and weak constrained efficiency
are essentially equivalent concepts. However when there are two or more goods
they axe quite different. In definition 15 real assets are viewed as goods delivery
assets: in definition 16 they are viewed as income delivery assets. Do the price
effects present in the latter definition create distortions which make it impossible
for a price taking equilibrium like a GEI equilibrium to be constrained efficient?
For a marginal change in the consumers portfolios (z) will change demand
and supply on the spot markets and hence the relative prices. If markets are
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incomplete agents evaluations of rates of substitution for income across the
states are different and then such relative price changes may have an effect
on welfare. A planner who takes into account these price changes thus has
an additional instrument for redistributing income across the states which is
not available to the more myopic competitive system. This key intuition was
formalized by Stiglitz (1982) in the context of a particular example: he stressed
however the possibility that this is a general phenomenon. That this is indeed
the case was confirmed by Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis (1986).
They consider a numeraire asset exchange economy (example 2, page 11)
in which there is no consumption at date 0: it will be convenient to translate
their result into the context of the standard model we have been considering, in
which there is consumption at date 0. The following assumption is then useful.
Assumption 3. (Separability) There exist differentiably strictly concave util-
r o r
ity functions u'Q : R+ — R , u\ : R+ — R such that
u\x) =u iQ (x ) + u[(x1 ) , Vi G R+ , i= 1, ...,/.
It is also convenient to express the parametrisation of preferences that is
needed a little differently as follows. Let U denote the space of utility functions
satisfying Assumption 1 endowed with the C 2 compact open topology. For a
numeraire asset economy we let
A =
J 14 1 A
Asi . . . A JS1
eRSJ
denote the asset returns matrix. The Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis result can
then be stated as follows.
Theorem 26. Let £(u,u:;A) be a numeraire asset economy in which the
agents characteristics {u,uj) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 3. If (i) the returns
matrix A is in general position (ii) there exist z 6 li with Az > and
z'
€
R J with A 3 z' ^ 0, s = 1, ..., S (iii) 2 < J < S (iv) < 2(L - 1) <
/ < S(L — 1), then there exists an open dense set AcWxfi such that for
(fl,u>)
€
A every GEI equilibrium ((x, z), (p, q)) can be improved upon by a
constrained feasible plan ((7, r), (x.p)) satisfying 7
1
= qz\ i — 1, ..., /.
SO
Remark. To bring out the striking feature of this theorem the following
clarification is useful. We have seen that a GEI equilibrium yields a con-
strained feasible plan ((7, z),(x,p)) in which the fees charged to the agents
satisfy 7' = qz\ i = 1, ...,/. In comparing such an equilibrium with any alter-
native constrained feasible plan ((7,z),(r,p)) it is useful to decompose the fee
as
y-fz' + r1", t = l,...,I (58)
referring to the component r1 as a transfer to agent i. With the decomposition
(58) the vector of transfers r = (r 1 , ..., r
1
) must be chosen to lie in the space of
transfers
r = It en1
]
£V =
We say that the alternative plan ((q a z + r, z),(x,p)) is constrained feasible
with (without) transfers if r ^ (= 0). Theorem 26 asserts that the welfare
of each agent can be improved without resorting to transfers provided there are
not too many agents [I < S(L — 1)). Since the welfare of the agents is changed
by inducing changes in the (5 + 1)(L — 1) relative prices, it is clear that there
must be a bound on the number of agents. Indeed Mas-Colell (19S7) has given
an example showing that theorem 26 is not valid if the upper bound on / is
removed.
If the planner is free to choose not only the portfolios (z) but also any
vector of transfers r £ T then we are resorting to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion,
namely the idea that welfare is improved if the gains of the winners are sufficient
to compensate for the losses of the loosers. In this case there are I — 1 additional
control variables at the disposition of the planner and the welfare of an arbitrary
number of agents can be improved after the payment of appropriate transfers.
In the following theorem we do not restrict ourselves to numeraire assets, but
consider rather the general class of real asset structures.
Theorem 27. Let £(u,u;A) be a reai asset exchange economy in which
agents characteristics (u,u>) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 3. If(i) < J < S (ii)
L > 1 (in) I > (L — 1)5, then there exists an open dense set A C U x Q x A
such that for (u,u,.4) 6 A every GEI equilibrium allocation is constrained
inefficient with transfers.
SI
Remark. If A is restricted to being a numeraire asset structure and if we
assume A £ R is in general position then the genericity with respect to A
can be omitted (i.e. AcWx Q).
Proof. We decompose the proof into two parts. Step 1: derive the first
order conditions for constrained efficiency. Step 2: show that there is an open
dense set A such that these conditions are not satisfied at any equilibrium of
an economy with parameters (u,lj,A) G A.
Step 1. When the planner chooses a fee-portfolio pair (7, z) for each of the /
agents in the economy he in essence assigns a virtual eniovjment
u£=K-7'eoi, u[+Az% 1 = 1,.../ (59)
to each of the / agents. The plan (7, 2) thus leads to the virtual exchange econ-
omy £(u, uj). An allocation is then induced as a (pure) spot market equilibrium
of E(u,u>). Thus each agent's demand function is given by
i'(p,pDw')= arg max u*(x'), z = l,...J (60)
x
x G5(p,p a J)
£(p,m') = {x* e Rn
I
p x
l
= m'}, m i
€ R+V
and a spot market equilibrium price p E R"+ is a solution of the system of
excess demand equations
F(P,u) = 5>'W a u,') - «'') = (61)
1=1
Since the budget sets B{p,p a;') are independent of the levels of the spot
prices, we normalise the spot prices so that p s \ = 1,3 = 0, 1, . . . , S.
If u is a regular parameter value for the economy £(u, uj) then any equi-
librium price can be written as a smooth function p( uj ) in a neighborhood of
u>. A marginal change (dj,dz) in the planner's decision induces a marginal
change in the virtual endowments
(dy,dz) — <%' = {dJ,dJ ) = (-d1 ie01 ,Adz i \ t = l,...,/ (62)
S2
where we assume that (d-y,dz) satisfy
/ /
X>' = 0, ]>>* = (63)
As the economy moves to a neighboring virtual exchange economy
£(">£) —£(«>£ +du)
each equilibrium changes
(x, p) — (x + ffx, p + dp)
where p + dp = p(u + duj ). Each consumer i adjusts consumption so as to
satisfy the changed budget constraints
p a dx i =p a dw { -dp n(x' -£'), i = l,...J (64)
The first order conditions at the spot market equilibrium (x,p) imply that for
each agent z there exist A' 6 K-++ such that
Djiu'ss A* p, i = 1,...,
J
(65)
The change in utility for agent i,du' = (D £ iu')dx' can thus be written as
du l = V- (p n dw
{
-dp o(x'
-£)), i = l,...I (66)
Let A* = (Aj Ai) and let ««" = (1, *j) = (1, $, . . . , if). Using (62), (64),
°
(65) and Assumption 3 (cfu 1 = c^uj,
-f du[), (66) can be written as
( i ) rfuj = -rfpo(5J - w[)-«*y', 1 = 1,...,/
/ \
(67)
fp-Jc/«i = 7f«V(pi;.4)^-7ri(dp1 a(x«- g|))
Let us again make use of Assumption 3. Suppose we can find a change in the
portfolios dz such that
£ (£) rf,, t > o <cs )
S3
Since the period economy £(«o, w ) is a self-contained GE economy we can
generate any profile of date utility changes du Q = (dul, . . . ,<1uq) satisfying
^2i—i ( tt ) duQ = 0, by an appropriate choice of fees d-y = (df* , . . . , d-f
1
). Thus
if (68) holds then we can find du such that
du* - du\ + du[ > 0, i = l,...,i"
Hence a necessary condition for constrained efficiency is that
y2(xijdu[=Q for all dz£RJI satisfying Y]dzi =0 (69)
Assumption 3 implies that the virtual economy splits up into a date and a
date 1 economy
5(11, «) = (^tio, «),£(«!, «•))
(70)
with excess demand equations (61) written as
*b(po, ^ ) = (a )
Fl (Pl ,u i
i
)
= (b)
The spot price function of a regular economy can thus be decomposed as
pfe) = (po( £Q ),pi( yj ))
Consider a GEI equilibrium ((x,z,(p, q)j for which the induced virtual endow-
ment Q is regular. The first order conditions for agent z's portfolio choice
imply z[V(pi,A) = q, i = 1,...,/. Thus using (67), the necessary condition
(69) becomes
£(iW = £*i(dpin(*i- *;)) =
V A
(71)
i=i
for all price changes dp\ achievable by the planner,namely those satisfying
*-E
i=i du:'
*6 E^,=0 ^ x^'e(A), i = i,...,/ (72)
«=i
S4
where f>\ denotes the truncated system of prices obtained by omitting the price
of good 1 in each state (recall dp9 \ = 0,s = 1,... , 5). Let (x',w) and F-i denote
the truncations of (x\u/) and F\. Define the (L — 1)5 x 5 matrix of differences
in the income effects between agent a and agent / (truncated with respect to
good 1 in each state)
dxl dx{ dxl dx[
Q« =
im\ dm{ dm% dm !s ±
<* = !,. ..,/-!
OR
(73)
Differentiating the equilibrium equations (70)(b) and noting that -ppr1- is non-
singular at a regular value u x gives
dpi = -
dpi
-\ -i 7-1
J2QoV(Pi)dz a
Q=l
Thus if we define the weighted net trade vector (at the equilibrium)
I
e-j^infxi-w'jei^- 1-1)5 (74)
i=i
and let (•, •) denote the inner product on Iv S then the efficiency condition
(71), (72) reduces to the orthogonality condition
dF\
dpi
T 1 /-i
Yl QoV{p l )dza t i) =0, V(rfz 1 ,...-,rfz/- ,)6RJ(/- 1) (75)
a=l
If we can show that the (L — l)S x J(I — 1) matrix
M = QiV(p1 ) f ...g/- l v(p1 ) (76)
has rank (L — 1)5 then the only vector £ that can solve (75) is £ = 0. Since the
markets are incomplete the vectors (^i)f=1 are generically distinct. This can
be used to show that generically £ in (74) is not zero, so that the orthogonality
condition (75) is generically not satisfied in a GEI equilibrium.
Step 2. To complete the proof it suffices to show that there is an open dense
set A CU x Q. x A such that for every (u,u;,
-4) € A there are a finite number
of equilibria at each of which:
S5
(a) the induced virtual exchange economy S(ui, u/ ) is regular or equiva-
lently
Wi 7^0
(b) ^0
(c) for some column V^(pi) of the matrix V(pi) the vectors {QiVJ (pi . .
.
Ql(S-i)^ j (Pi)} are linearly independent.
Since the negation of each of the statements (a), (b) and (c) can be writ-
ten as an equation or system of equations which is added to the existing GEI
equilibrium equations, to prove the result we need to show that in each case
we obtain a system of equations (h = 0) with more equations than unknowns
which can be controlled (h m 0). A transversality argument then concludes the
proof.
respect to (a;, A). Thus we add the equation = (f = 0) to the GEI
To prove (a) and (b) we fix u G U and apply genericity arguments with
aft
equilibrium equations and show that the resulting system of equations can be
controlled. The argument can be repeated for a countable dense collection
of utility funtions {ti n }^Lj = {u\, . . . ,u In }'^L 1 . Since the resulting property is
open, we obtain an open dense set A' C U x Q. x A at which (a) and (b) hold.
Showing that (c) is not true is equivalent to showing that the system of
equations
L(S-l)
J2 6aQa V
r;
'(pi) = for some 6 G 5(L_1)5
" 1 (77)
o=l
has a solution (where 5^ ^ * is the (L — 1)5 — 1 dimensional unit sphere).
Note that adjoining (77) to the equilibrium equations involves adding (L —
1)5 — 1 new variables (b) and (L — 1)5 equations. To prove that the system of
equations (77) can be "controlled" without affecting the equilibrium equations,
we note that if (77) is satisfied then 6 £ 5( L-1 )S-i implies 6,- ^ for some i:
""controlling" the equations then amounts to showing that it is possible to make
an arbitrary infinitesimal change in the matrix QiV 3 (p\) by perturbing agent
fs utility funtion n l — the perturbation being effected in such a way that the
gradient Dr i u\{x\) remains unchanged, so that the equilibrium equations are
unaffected. The date 1 matrix of income effects for the problem in (60) (the
S6
truncation of which appears in (73)) is given by
r
P\
IC =
dx\
,
idm 1
(4x)-, [Pl]r([Pl]Kx)- 1 [Pl]T)"
1
,[Pl] =
PS
where uzz = Z?
2
,
,• u
x (x\) denotes the matrix of second derivatives of u\ evalu-
ated at x\. Let u z — Dz i ui(*i) denote the gradient of Uj_ at x^. The vector of
utility functions u £U can now be perturbed, u — u G U in such a way that
u
a
is unchanged for a ^ i, and u' satisfies Assumption 1 and
4=<4 ('a-^Kr+c (78)
For such a change
<*<9.t"'(pi) = dlCV^pt)
Pick any vector c 6 It* ! ' with || c ||< e for € sufficiently small. We need to
show that there is a matrix C" satisfying (7S) such that dICVJ(pi) = c. We
leave it to the reader to check that C can be chosen so that
[pi]C"'[pi]
r
= and C'[Pl ]
T
v = c
where v = {[pi](u xz )~
1
\pi]
T)~ 1 V^(pi) ^ 0, showing that the system of equa-
tions (77) can be controlled.
This perturbation argument shows that there is a dense subset A C A'
such that property (c) holds. Since this property is open A can be taken to be
an open dense set and the proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Remark. A final comment on theorem 27 is in order. If J = (spot markets
only) then d u l = in (72) so that (71) holds: a GEI market structure consist-
ing only of spot markets is constrained efficient. If J > S then generically the
asset structure A is regular so that generically 7f£ = 7fi,t = 1,..
.
,
I : thus not
only does (71) hold but in addition we have Pareto optimality (recall theorem
3). With only one good (L = 1) there are no price effects (dpi = 0) so that (71)
always holds (see theorem 25). The two special cases where (71) is satisfied,
namely when there is no net-trade in equilibrium Xi — u 1 = (which arises if
the initial endowment u is Pareto optimal) or when the income matrices satisfy
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QQ = 0, at = 1, . . . , J — 1 (which arises if the utility funtions u[ axe additively
separable and identical homothetic within each state) are eliminated by the
choice of the set A.
5.2 Inefficiency in Production
In the previous section we have shown that in an exchange economy
£(u, u>\ A), a knowledgeable planner can in principle exploit differences in agents'
income effects in a GEI equilibrium to induce an improved allocation of the port-
folios-r1
,
. .
.
, z
1
. In section 4 we defined the concept of a stock market (GEI)
equilibrium for a production economy. Are there new sources of inefficiency
that arise when we consider a GEI equilibrium for a production economy? This
question is important since the stock market is one of the major institutions on
which society's risks in the activity of production are shared among agents in
the economy and which influences the production decisions of firms. If we recog-
nise the fact that the structure of markets is incomplete can the stock market
be expected to perform its role of exchanging risks and allocating investment
efficiently?
To answer this question we need to extend the concept of constrained
efficiency to a production economy. The planner is now viewed as choosing not
only the fee and portfolio (Y,z') for each consumer but also the production
plan y J for each producer. The consumption allocations (x) is then determined
as before through spot markets at an appropriate market clearing price (p).
Definition 17. A plan ((7, 2, y), (x,p)) is constrained feasible for the pro-
duction economy £(n, V, (,uv?) (constrained feasible with no short sales) if
(i) X> , = (») £f=,(;'-C') = o, (zeni1 )
(iii) jHeY>, ;=1,...,J.
ss
/ J
(iv) (x,p) satisfy ]T(x« - u>«) = £(yJ' + if)
x' = arg max u'(x'), 1 = 1,...,/
subject to Pq(xq - uJq) = po(-7'eoi + (yo + Vo)*')
Pi & (x\ - u[) = PiiVi + li)?
A plan ((7, z, y), (x,p)) is corwirame^ efficient if it is constrained feasible
and there does ot exist a constrained feasible plan ((7,2, y),(x,p)) such that
u'V) >u ,'(x ,'),i = 1,...,/.
Remark. Diamond (1967) showed that if there is only one good and if firms'
production functions exhibit multiplicative uncertainty then every stock market
equilibrium allocation is constrained efficient. Dreze (1974) showed that in the
one good case if firms have general neoclassical production sets then a necesary
condition for constrained efficiency is that firm j uses the objective function
u>(y>) = pi . yi with (Sj = Y^ ZW
1=1
However as Dreze pointed out, since the constrained feasible plans of a produc-
tion economy are nonconvex, the necessary conditions are not sufficient. In fact
he gave examples of stock market equilibria which are constrained inefficient
when L = 1. Recently Geanakoplos-Magill-Quinzii-Dreze (1987) have shown
that if markets are incomplete and if there are two or more goods then generi-
cally every Dreze equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient (with no short
sales). While their argument is carried out for the case of a Dreze equilibrium
their construction indicates that the result will surely hold for any objective
funtion implying price taking behaviour on the part of the firms.
First order conditions for efficiency. When a planner chooses a triple
(7, 2, y) this is equivalent to choosing a virtxial endowment of goods
#'"= (u>£
-7'eoi +{yo+rjQ )z i , u{ + (yx +J]i)z'), i = 1,...,/ (7S)
for each consumer. The consumption allocation and price (x, p) are then a
spot market equilibrium of the virutal exchange economy S(xi^u) defined by
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equations (70). Let ((f,z,y),(x,p)) be a constrained feasible plan for which the
induced virtual endowment Q defined by (78) is regular. A marginal change
(d~f,dz,dy) in the planners decision, which must satisfy the conditions of local
feasibility
/ /
t=l i=l
dyj eTy>dYj , jai,...,;
induces a marginal change in the virtual endowment
(79)
(dj, dz, dy) — dJ = -dYe + (y + r})dz i + cfyz 1', i = 1, . . . , J (80)
where e = (1,0,...,0) € R . The resulting change in utility for each
agent i is given by (66). By the same argument as in the previous section,
under Assumption 3 a necessary condition for constrained efficiency is that
Yli=i ( v") du
l
= for all locally feasible changes (d~f,dz,dy) given by (79).
Dividing (66) by \ lQ and summing over i gives the marginal change in social
welfare arising from the change (df,dz,dy)
1 / 1 \ l -£ T7 dui = £*'" ' (P ° (y + n))dz { +£*•. (p n dy)?
1=1 ° ,=1
i
,=1
(Si)
i=l
where YLi=i ^o^Poi^o ~ £') = ^PoX^i=i(^o — <£*) = since spot markets
clear in the virtual equilibrium. The first two terms in (81) represent the direct
income effect of the change (dz,dy), the last term is the indirect price effect.
Let ((x, z,y), (p, (7, tt)) be a Dreze equilibrium (definition 13). It can be
shown that there is a generic set Q such that for every economy £(u,Y, £,uj,ri)
with (a;, rj) 6 ft, in each stock market equilibrium ((x, z
, y), (p, <7, fr)) the induced
endowment u defined by (7S) with 7 = (£ — z)<J is regular for the spot market
economy 5(u,w). Thus we can evaluate the marginal change in social welfare
arising from a change (dy,dz,dy) in the neighborhood of the stock market
equilibrium. The first order conditions for the portfolio choice z* of agent i
imply that there exist ^IJ> such that
7T«' • (p U (yj + f)J )) = qj - p
l\ Pij = if z) >
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Multiplying by dz l- and summing over i and j gives
/ J
J2 r - (P (y + *?))<**'" = -EE^J = -^2
.
= 1 ;=1
(82)
1=1
The first order condition for pro/££ maximising by firm j imply
/
E */*'" • (p a cfyJ ) = V cfyJ G fy dY' (S3)
i=i
77&tz.s in a stock market equilibrium the marginal change in social welfare reduces
to
1
1
r
..
An
t=l «=1
The first term represents the cost of the no-short sales constraints zj > and
this term is zero in an equilibrium where V- > 0, for all i,j. The second term is
the effect on welfare of the induced changes in spot prices: it is this term which
is crucial to our analysis.
/?(•) is a function of w, which in turn is a function of the planner's action
(7, z,y). We indicate this by writing
ii,z,y) —» w —> p
Let
-r^-f and ^ denote the partial derivatives of the vector valued func-
dzj dy J3(
tion pi with respect to z ,} and y J3( respectively, written as column vectors.
Thus
dpi
dy{
dpi dpi
dy[ dyJs
is an SL x SL matrix. We thus have the following necessary conditions for
constrained efficiency.
Proposition 28. (Efficiency conditions) Under Assumptions 3, if a. Dreze
equilibrium ((x, z,y), (p, q, n)) is constrained efficient then
co E*i
i=l
Opi dpi
= 0, j = \ J
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for all k and k' such that zj" > 0, zf >
dp
I
(ii) E^ '1 ,U
foralldy' eTijdY', j = l,...,J
Remark. We call (i) the portfolio efficiency condition and (ii) the production
efficiency condition, (i) is the same as the efficiency condition (71), (72) of the
previous section. Consider the following cases for which (i) and (ii) hold.
(a) There is one good (L = 1). (i) and {ii) hokl since the price effects van-
ish. This explains the result of Diamond (1967), for with multiplicative
uncertainty the set of feasible allocations is convex and the first order
conditions are sufficient. For the general (one good) case studied by
Dreze (1974) the set of feasible allocations is nonconvex and the nec-
essary conditions are not sufficient. As mentioned above Dreze gave
examples with L = 1 which are not constrained efficient.
(b) All agents present value vectors coincide. This happens if the asset mar-
kets are complete and the portfolio constraints z x- > are not binding.
(c) There is zero net trade (x\ — u>' = 0, i' = 1, . .
.
, /) in the induced virtual
equilibrium. This occurs in the rather exceptional case where the induced
virtual endowment is Pareto optimal.
Case (c) is clearly exceptional, (a) and (b) suggest the possibility that if
there are at least two goods in each state (L > 2) and if markets are incomplete
(J < S) then Dreze equilibria are generically constrained inefficient. That this
is indeed the case was proved by Geanakoplos-Magill-Quinzii-Dreze (19S7) who
established the following result.
Theorem 29. (Generic Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium)
Let £(u,l', C, <<>, i]) be a production economy satisfying Assumptions 1-3. If
(i) I > 2 (ii) L > 2 (Hi) I + J < S + 1 (iv) E> = IT for some firm
j € {1,— !«/}) then there exists a generic set 12* C ^ such that for every
(a;, n) 6 fi* each Dreze equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient with
transfers.
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Proof. The idea is to write the system of equations satisfied by an equi-
librium and to show that any solution of these equations will generically not
satisfy the efficiency conditions (ii) of proposition 28. Modulo some technical
preliminaries involved in showing that generically equilibria are of full rank and
locally smooth functions of the parameters, the problem reduces to the analysis
of the local behaviour of the spot market equilibria price p(a>) of the induced
virtual economy £(u, u).
Let
3(p,«) = £(*W°w ,")-«')-o
i=i
denote the system of equations defining p{w)- The efficiency condition (ii) can
be written as the inner product condition
dy[£ *j a (*j - J ) ) = 0, V dy[ <= RL5 (84)dpidy[
«=i
In view of the normalisation of spot prices dp 3 \ = 0, 5 = 0, 1, ... 5. Thus if
we let Q = dpi
ldy{
: RLS niL~ 1)S,QT : R(L" 1)S — RL5,u = dy{,v =
Ht=i "i. a ( x i ~ w i) tnen (S4) reduces to
(Qu,v) = (u,QTv) = Vu6RLS QTv = Q (85)
If we can show rank (QT ) = (L — 1)5 then v = is the only solution of (85).
Since it can be shown that fr 1
,
. .
.
, ff
;
are distinct, v ^ generically.
We show rank QT = (L — 1)5. In view of the separability assumption
A3 the equation Z(p,u) = splits into a pair of equations Zo(po, g ) =
0,^i (pi, u
l
) = 0. Differentiating the latter at lj = u and using the fact that
Pi(£) — Pi sives
dp i
LS
OP
T = ~Z :uMdm7P« + e iati \
3=1,.. .,5
<?=!,. ..,L
(86)
where e^ £ R is the vector whose component (5, C) is 1 and whose other
components are zero. Since u? is regular the matrix D =
dpi
has rank
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(L — 1)5, so that B 1 is well-defined. Thus (86) can be written as
Q = B~ l C
where the matrix C is given by (recall p,j = 1,3 = 1, . . .
,
S)
C =
2-'= 1 idm\
EL* ax si.; d?n.
i-ft.EL,»J^
P12 2-,-i *J^
-PslE,=i 2>-9m'c
1-foH.^Sm'c
C is a matrix with 5L columns and (L — 1)5 rows. To prove that rank
Q = (L — 1)5 it suffices to show that rank C = (L — 1)5. Let C3 t denote column
(s,£) of C. If we subtract from each clumn C3 t,£ > 2, the multiple p3tC3 \ of
column C3 i,s = 1,...5 then we obtain a new matrix D = [...,C3i,C3 2 —
PsiCsii • • > C3 l — PslCsx, . . .] with the same rank as C
D =
~ zJ,= i zj
=.• dx\
dm,
^ l=1 Z
> dr~ lnn\
T I t dx^^ l=1 } dm\
I - E,=i l)
-idx*
Ml*
Yli=\ z)
-i dx\
nnl
iTTlr
r—^ I — | UX ^
~ 2-.=i zj
•r£.
3m'c
where / is an (L — 1) x (L
Q.E.D.
1) identity matrix. Clearly rank D = (L — 1)5.
References. The need to formulate an appropriate concept of constrained
efficiency in a model with incomplete markets was first recognised by Diamond
(1967). Theorem 25 was proved by Grossman (1977). One of the earliest at-
tempts to formalise the constrained inefficiency of GEI is due to Stiglitz (19S2).
The first fully articulated general equilibrium version of this result is due to
Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis (19S6). Theorem 29 is one of several inefficiency
results obtained by Geanakoplos-Magill-Quinzii-Drcze (19S7).
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6. Concluding Remarks
6.1 Interface with Finance
A key idea that emerges from the GEI model is the interdependence bet-
ween the real and financial sectors (markets) in the economy. In this survey we
have concentrated on the qualitative properties of the GEI equilibrium alloca-
tions with real and nominal assets and with production. We have not stressed
or explored the qualitative properties of the asset prices in such equilibria.
Such an analysis leads us to the domain of finance. The one good model can
be viewed as the basic equilibrium model of finance. Under the assumption of
quadratic utilities it leads to the clasical capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
The no-arbitrage pricing formula
s
« =tW, -7 = 1 ^ (87)
3=1
is used as the point of departure for exploring the relation between asset prices
and risk characteristics of the economy. In the CAPM model it leads to the
famous beta pricing formula relating asset prices to their volatility relative to
the market portfolio. The principle of no-arbitrage which underlies (S7) forms
the basis for a rich and varied analysis in the theory of finance — indeed it can
be viewed as the central principle of modern finance. The Black-Scholes theory
of derivative asset pricing is one of the most striking applications. For this and
related issues in the theory of finance we refer the reader to the companion
paper of Durne (19S9).
6.2 Secondary Assets
An important family of securities are the various secondary (derivative)
assets, in particular options. Ross (197G) was the first to point out that in-
troducing a sufficient number of option contracts might in principle provide
a relatively low transaction cost way to achieve full spanning. Fiiesen (1979)
has described in detail how to implement any complete markets equilibrium
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in a multiperiod model by constructing options on stocks. McManus (1986)
has shown that in a real asset model with enough options to potentially span,
equilibria exist generically.
When the financial markets (including options) are incomplete, the pres-
ence of options causes difficulties. It is useful to distinguish two cases. Those
in which the striking prices are denominated in a numeraire commodity (or
commodity bundle) and those in which the striking prices are denominated in
nominal terms. In the first case Polemarchakis and Ku (1986) have exhibited
a robust counterexample to existence of equilibrium using European options.
In such a model, pseudo-equilibria always exist under standard assumptions;
the difficulty is that it may not be possible generically to perturb the param-
eters of the model to force the pseudo-equilibria to become true equilibria. In
a model which includes Polemarchakis-Ku type counterexamples Krasa (1987)
has shown, that in a precise sense the "likelihood" of nonexsitence is smaller
the more variable the aggregate endowment vector. Kahn and Krasa (1990)
have exhibited robust examples of nonexistence with American options. These
counterexamples only require L = 1 and do not appear amenable to the analysis
of Krasa (19S7).
In the case where the options have nominal strike prices, Krasa and Werner
( 19S9) have shown that equilibria always exist, and that the dimension of the set
of equilibrium allocations may in some cases be equal to the number of states 5,
rather that 5—1 as in the nominal asset case of section 3: thus, absolute price
levels may matter as well as relative price levels across states. Even if there
are enough assets (including options) to span all states, not only are complete
market allocations achievable, but also many inefficient equilibrium allocations
will be present. Kahn and Krasa (1990) have shown that with American options
with nominal strike prices, even if there are enough options to potentially span,
only inefficient equilibria may rise. The basic difficulty with American options
is that an agent, with the choice of early exercise of the option, can affect
the span of markets. Clearly much research remains to be done to properly
integrate options into the GEI model.
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6.3 Endogenous Asset Formation
This survey has concentrated on models in which the asset structure is
taken as exogenous (with the exception of firms' equity contracts), and in which
the completeness or incompleteness of the asset structure is exogenous. An issue
which is essential to the continuing study of GEI models is an understanding of
the types of assets that are likely to be introduced and successfully traded, and
whether or not it is reasonable to suppose that such a process of endogenous
asset formation eventually leads to completeness of the markets. On the empir-
ical side a useful survey of the recent history of innovation in publicly traded
security markets is given by Miller (1986). On the theoretical side there is a
paucity of research on this problem. Silber (1981) and Duffie—Jackson (19SS)
have examined the problem of designing and marketing futures contracts. Allen
and Gale (1988) have examined a GEI model in which firms design optimal secu-
rities in the presence of transactions costs. Cuny (19S9) has studied a strategic
model of exchanges designing securities to maximize their brokerage fees.
Related to the issue of endogenous asset formation and whether or not it
will lead to complete markets, is the problem of demonstrating that "almost"
complete markets will lead to "almost" Pareto efficient allocations. Consider
a model in which the number of states is countably infinite and there are only
a finite number of securities. With less assets than states the markets can in
general never be complete, but one can ask, if equilibrium allocations approach
Pareto efficiency, as the number of traded securities approaches infinity. The
initial research on this was done by Green-Spear (19S7), and then generalized by
Zame (1988). Zame showed that in a precise sense generically, Pareto efficiency
will fail in the limit as the number of securities approaches infinity.
6.4 Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy and default like limited liability can be viewed as contrac-
tual arrangements designed to augment the span of markets. When prop-
erly formulated they should play a central role in the GEI model. Although
bankruptcy has been studied in the context of temporary equilibrium mod-
els (Green (1974), Stahl (19S5 a,b)) there have so far been only a few stud-
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ies (Dubey-Geanakoplos-Shubik (1989), Dubey-Geanakoplos (1989)) in the
framework of the GEI model. The difficulty lies in satisfactorily modelling the
phenomenon of default without breaking the basic GEI equilibrium concept in
the process. By introducing the idea of default penalties and an equilibrium
default rate on each contract the above authors have shown how the concept of
a GEI equilibrium can be extended to include the phenomenon of default. An
interesting result which makes use of this default-GEI equilibrium has recently
been obtained by Zame (1989). He shows in a model with an infinite state
space that equilibrium allocations are approximately Pareto efficient if the de-
fault penalty is large and the assets "almost span" all uncertainty, a conclusion
which is false if default is not permitted.
6.5 Alternative Approaches to Firm Behaviour
In section 4 we examined only a few approaches to modelling the prob-
lem of decision making on the part of firms. An approach we did not discuss,
but which is important in practice is to incorporate into the model the voting
process by which corporate firms are typically controlled, that is, shareholders
vote for a board of directors, and the board hires a manager. Initial stud-
ies of this corporate voting mechanism as a pure majority voting problem are
those of Gevers (1974), Benninga and Muller (1979), (1981) Winter (1981), and
Sadanand and Williamson (1988). Dreze (1985) has developed a model in which
the board of directors has veto power and demonstrates existence of equilib-
rium. DeMarzo (1988b) has examined the relation between voting mechanisms
and value maximization. He also shows the useful result that any production
equilibrium which satisfies the Pareto criterion with respect to the shareholders
must be a stock market equilibrium (as in definition 12), with each firms' J
being a convex combination of shareholder present value vectors 7r' (as in the
Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria).
Particularly relevant to studying firm behaviour and the ability of share-
holders to influence firm behaviour is the mechanism of firm takeovers. Hart
(1977) has studied a GEI model in which takeover bids are possible and looks
at the question of whether or not the possibility of takeovers leads to value
maximization. More recently these problems have been studied in the frame-
OS
work of incomplete contracts and asymmetric information — see for exam-
ple Grossman-Hart (1987) and Harris-Ravin (1987) who have studied the one
share-one vote rule in the context of corporate takeovers.
References
ALLEN F. and D. GALE (19SS) : Optimal Security Design; The Review of
Financial Studies, vol. 1., No. 3, Feb. 1988, pp. 229-263.
ARROW, K.J. (1953) : Le role des valeurs boursieres pour la repartition la
meilleure des risques; Econometrie, pp. 41-47; discussion, pp. 47-48,
Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scien-
tifique No. 40 (Paris 1952) C.N.R.S. Paris 1953; English translation
as "The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk bearing",
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 31 (1964), pp. 91-96.
ARROW, K.J. (1974) : Limited knowledge and economic analysis; American
Economic Review, vol. 64, pp. 1-10.
ARROW, K. and G. DEBREU (1954) : Existence of equilibrium for a compet-
itive economy; Econometrica, vol. 22, pp. 265-290.
BALASKO, Y. (1976) : L'Equilibre economique du point de vue differentiel;
Thesis, Universite Paris IX-Dauphine.
BALASKO, Y. (1988) : Foundations of the theory of general equilibrium; Aca-
demic Press, Boston.
BALASKO, Y. and D. CASS (19S5) : Regular demand with several, general
budget constraints; CARESS Working Paper No. 85-20, University
of Pennsylvania.
99
BALASKO, Y. and D. CASS (19S9) : The structure of financial equilibrium: I.
Exogenous yields and unrestricted participation; Econometrica, vol.
57, pp. 135-162; CARESS Working Paper No. 85-23R, University of
Pennsylvania.
BALASKO, Y., D. CASS and P. SICONOLFI (1987) : The structure of fi-
nancial equilibrium with exogenous yields: II. Endogenous yields
and restricted participation; CARESS Working Paper, University of
Pennsylvania; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical Economics.
BHATTACHAYRA, G. (1987) : Notes on optimality of rational expectations
equilibrium with incomplete markets; Journal of Economic Theory,
•-
-vol. 42, No. 2, Aug. 1987, pp. 191-208.
BENNINGA, S. and E. MULLER (1979) : Majority choice and the objective
function of the firm under uncertainty; Bell Journal of Economics,
vol. 10, pp. 670-682.
BENNINGA, S. and E. MULLER (19S1) : Majority choice and the ojective fun-
tion of the firm under uncertainty: reply; Bell Journal of Economics,
vol. 12, pp. 338-339.
BLACK, F. and M. SCHOLES (1973) : The pricing of options and corporate
liabilities; Journal of Political Economy, vol. 3, pp. 637-654.
BROCKER, T. and K. JANICH (1982) : Introduction to differential topology;
Cambridge University Press.
CASS, D. (1984) : Competitive equilibria in incomplete financial markets; CA-
RESS Working Paper No. 84-09, University of Pennsylvania.
CASS, D. (1985) : On the "Number" of equilibrium allocations with incomplete
financial markets; CARESS Working Paper No. 85-16, University of
Pennsylvania.
CHAE, S. (19S8) : Existence of competitive equilibrium with incomplete mar-
kets; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 44, No. 1, Feb. 1988, pp.
179-188.
CUNY, C- (19S9) : The role of liquidity in futures market innovation; Working
Paper, University of California at Irvine.
DEBREU, G. (1959) : Theory of Value; New York: Wiley.
100
DEBREU, G. (1970) : Economies with a finite set of equilibria; Econometrics,
vol. 38, pp. 387-392.
DEBREU, G. (1972) : Smooth preferences; Econometrics, vol. 40, pp. 603-
615.
DEBREU, G. (1976) : Smooth preferences, A corrigendum; Econometrics, vol.
44, pp. 304-318.
DeMARZO, P. (1988a) : An extension of the Modigliani-Miller theorem to
stochastic economies with incomplete markets; Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 45, pp. 353-369.
DeMARZO, P. (1988b) : Majority voting and corporate control: The rule of
the dominant shareholder; Bonn Discussion Paper A-210.
DIAMOND, P. (1967) : The role of a stock market in a general equilibrium
model with technological uncertainty; American Economic Review,
vol. 57, pp. 759-776.
DIERKER, E. (1982) : Regular economies; in: K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intriligator
(eds.): Handbook of Mathematical Economics, vol. 1, North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
DREZE, J. (1974) : Investment under private ownership: Optimally, equilib-
rium and stability; in: J. Dreze (ed.), Allocation under uncertainty:
Equilibrium and optimality; New York: Wiley, pp. 129-165.
DREZE, J.H. (1985) : (Uncertainty and) The firm in general equilibrium theory;
Economic Journal, vol. 95 (Supplement: Conference Papers), pp. 1-
20.
DUBEY, P. and J. GEANAKOPLOS (19S9a) : Liquidity and bankruptcy with
incomplete markets: Pure exchange; Cowles Foundation Working Pa-
per # 900.
DUBEY, P. and J. GEANAKOPLOS (1989c) : Liquidity and bankruptcy with
incomplete markets: production; Cowles Foundation Working Paper,
Yale University.
DUBEY, O., GEANAKOPLOS, J. and M. SHUBIK (19S9) : Default and
efficiency in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets;
Cowles Foundation Working Paper # 879IL
101
DUFFIE, D. (1987) : Stochastic equilibria with incomplete financial markets;
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 41, pp. 405-416.
DUFFIE, D. (19S8) : Security markets, stochastic models; Academic Press,
New York.
DUFFIE, D. (1989) : Corrigenda on "Stochastic equilibria with incomplete
markets"; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 49., No. 2, Dec. 1989,
p. 384.
DUFFIE, D. (1989) : The theory of value in security markets; this volume.
DUFFIE, D. and M.O. JACKSON (1986) : Optimal innovation of future con-
tracts; Graduate School of Business, Research Paper No. 917, Stan-
ford University .
DUFFIE, D. and W. SHAFER (1985) : Equilibrium in incomplete markets I: A
basic model of generic existence; Journal ofMathematical Economics,
vol. 14, pp. 285-300.
DUFFIE, D. and W. SHAFER (1986a) : Equilibrium in incomplete markets II:
Generic existence in stochastic economies; Journal of Mathematical
Economics, vol. 15, pp. 199-216.
DUFFIE, D. and W. SHAFER (1986b) : Equilibrium and the role of the firm
in incomplete markets; Graduate School of Business, Research Paper
No. 915, Stanford University.
EKERN, S. and R. WILSON (1974) : On the theory of the firm in an economy
with incomplete markets; Bell Journal of Economics and Mangement
Science, vol. 5, pp. 171-180.
FISCHER, S. (1972) : Assets, contingent commodities, and the Slutsky equa-
tions; Econometrica, vol. 40, pp. 371-385.
FISCHER, S. (1977) : Long-term contracts, rational expectations, and the
optimal money supply rule; Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85,
pp. 191-205.
FRIESEN, P. (1979) : The Arrow-Debreu model extended to financial markets;
Econometrica, vol. 47, pp. 689-727.
GALE, D. (1960) : The theory of linear economic models; McGraw-Hill, New
York.
102
GEANAKOPLOS, J., MAGILL, M., QUINZII, M. and J. DREZE (1987) :
Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are
incomplete; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical Economics.
GEANAKOPLOS, J. and A. MAS-COLELL (1989) : Real indeterminacy with
financial assets; Journai of Economic Theory, vol. 47, No. 1, Feb.
1989, pp. 22-38.
GEANAKOPLOS, J. and H. POLEMARCHAKIS (1986) : Existence, regular-
ity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when
markets are incomplete; in: W.P. Heller, R.M. Ross, and D.A. Star-
rett (eds.), Uncertainty, information and communication, Essays in
.-••« •
-honor of Kenneth Arrow, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
GEANAKOPLOS, J. and H. POLEMARCHAKIS (1988) : Observability and
optimality; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical Economics.
GEANAKOPLOS, J. and W. SHAFER (1987) : Solving systems of simulta-
neous equations in economics; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical
Economics.
GEVERS, L. (1974) : Competitive equilibrium of the stock exchange and Pareto
efficiency; in: J.H. Dreze (ed.), Allocation under Uncertainty: Equi-
librium and Optimality; New York: John Wiley and Sons.
GRANDMONT, J.-M. (19S2) : Temporary general equilibrium theory; in: K.J.
Arrow, and M.D. Intriligator (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, vol. II, ch. 19, pp. 879-922.
GRANDMONT, J.-M. (19SS) : Temporary equilibrium; Academic Press, San
Diego.
GREEN, J. (1973) : Temporary general equilibrium in a sequential trading
model with spot and futures transactions; Econometrica, vol. 41, pp.
1103-1124.
GREEN, R. and S. SPEAR (19S7) : Equilibria in large commodity spaces with
incomplete financial markets; Working Paper.
GROSSMAN, S. (1977) : A characterization of the optimality of equilibrium in
incomplete markets; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 15, pp. 1-15.
103
GROSSMAN, S.J. and O.D. HART (1979) : A theory of competitive equilib-
rium in stock market economies; Econometrica, vol. 47, pp. 293-330.
GROSSMAN, S.J. and O.D. HART (1987) : One share/one vote and the market
for corporate control; MIT Working Paper.
GUESNERIE, R. and J.-Y. JAFFRAY (1971) : Optimally of equilibrium of
plans, prices, and price expectations; in: J. Dreze (ed.), Allocation
under uncertainty: Equilibrium and optimality. New York: Wiley.
GUILLEMIN, V. and A. POLLACK (1974) : Differential topology; Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs.
HARRIS, M. and A. RAVIV (19S7) : Corporate control contests and capital
structure; Working Paper.
HARRISON, J.M. and D. KREPS (1979) : Martingales and arbitrage in multi-
period securities markets; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 20. pp.
381-408.
HART, 0. (1975) : On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure
is incomplete; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 418-
443.
HART, 0. (1977) : Takeover bids and stock market equilibrium; Journal of
Economic Theory, vol. 9, pp. 53-83.
HART, 0. (1979) : On shareholder unanimity in large stock market economies;
Econometrica, vol. 47, pp. 1057-1082.
HELLWIG, M. (19S1) : Bankruptcy, limited liability, and the Modigliani-Miller
Theorem; American Economic Review, vol. 71, pp. 155-170.
HIRSCH, M. (1976) : Differential topology; Springer Verlag, New York.
HIRSCH, W., MAGILL M. and A. MAS-COLELL (19S7) : A geometric ap-
proach to a class of equilibrium existence theorems; MRG Working
Paper; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical Economics.
HUSSEINI, S.Y., J.M. LASRY and M. MAGILL (19S6) : Existence of equilib-
rium with incomplete markets; MRG Working Paper; forthcoming,
Journal of Mathematical Economics.
104
KAHN, D. and S. KRASA (1990) : Non-existence and inefficiency of equilib-
ria with american options and convertible bonds; Working Paper,
University of Illinois.
KEYNES, J. (1936) : The general theory of employment, interest and money;
MacMillan, London.
KOOPMANS, T.C. (1951) : Activity analysis of production and allocation;
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York.
KRASA, S. (1987) : Exsitence of competitive equilibria for options markets;
Graduate School of Business, Research Paper No. 977, Stanford Uni-
versity; forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.
KRASA, S. and J. WERNER (1989) : Equilibria with options: existence and
indeterminacy; Bonn Discussion Paper No. A-230.
KREPS, D. (1979) : Three essays on capital markets; Institute for Mathe-
matical Studies in The Social Sciences, Technical Report No. 298,
Stanford University.
KREPS, D. (19S2) : Multiperiod securities and the efficient allocation of risk:
A comment on the Black-Scholes option pricing model; in: J. McCall,
The economics of uncertainty and information, University of Chicago
Press.
LeROY, S. (1989) : Efficient capital markets and martingales; Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, vol. 27, pp. 1583-1621.
MAGILL, M. and M. QUINZII (19SS) : Real effects of money with nominal
assets; MRG Working Paper, University of Southern California.
MAGILL, M. and M. QUINZII (1989) : The non-neutrality of money in a pro-
duction economy with nominal assets; MRG Working Paper, Univer-
sity of Southern California.
MAGILL, M. and W. SHAFER (19S4) : Allocation of aggregate and indi-
vidual risks through futures and insurance markets; MRG Working
Paper, Department of Economics, University of Southern California,
forthcoming in volume in honor of David Gale, W. Brock and M.
Majundar (eds.).
105
MAGILL, M. and W. SHAFER (1985) : Characterisation of generically com-
plete real asset structures; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical
Economics (revision of "Equilibrium and efficiency in a canonical
asset market model"), MRG Working Paper.
MAS-COLELL, A. (1985) : The theory of general economic equilibrium — A
differentiable approach; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MAS-COLELL, A. (1987) : An observation on Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis;
Working Paper.
McMANUS, D. (1984): Incomplete markets: Generic existence of equilibrium
and optimality properties in an economy with futures markets; Work-
ing Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
McMANUS, D. (1986) : Regular options equilibria; CARESS Working Paper
No. 86-13, University of Pennsylvania.
MILLER, M.H. (19S6) : Financial innovation: The last twenty years and the
next; Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 21, pp.
459-471.
MODIGLIANI, F. and M. MILLER (1958) : The cost of capital, corporate
finance, and the theory of investment; American Economic Review,
vol. 48, pp. 261-297.
NEWBERY, D.M. and J. STIGLITZ (1982) : The choice of techniques and the
optimality of market equilibrium with rational expectations; Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 223-246.
POLEMARCHAKIS, H. (19S8) : Portfolio choice, exchange rates and indeter-
minacy; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 414-421.
POLEMARCHAKIS, H. and B. KU (1976) : Options and equilibrium; forth-
coming', Journal of Mathematical Economics; Columbia University
Discussion Paper.
RADNER, R. (196S) : Competitive equilibrium under uncertainty; Economet-
rica, vol. 36, pp. 31-58.
RADNER, R. (1972) : Existence of equilibrium of plan, prices, and price ex-
pectations in a sequence of markets; Econometrica, vol. 40, No. 2,
pp. 2S9-303.
106
RADNER, R. (1974) : A note on unanimity of stockholder's preferences among
alternative production plans: A reformulation of the Ekern-Wilson
model; The Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science, vol.
5, pp. 181-184.
RADNER, R. (1982) : Equilibrium under uncertainty; in: K.J. Arrow and
M.D. Intriligator (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, vol.
II, North-Holland, Amsterdam, ch. 20, pp. 923-1006.
REPULLO, R. (1986) : On the generic existence of Radner equilibria when
there are as many securities as states of nature; Economics Letters,
vol. 21, pp. 101-105.
REPULLO, R. (1988) : A new characterization of the efficiency of equilibrium
with incomplete markets; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 44, No.
2, April 1988, pp. 217-230.
ROSS, S. (1976) : Options and efficiency
;
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
90, pp. 76-89.
SADANAND, A. and J. WILLIAMSON (1988) : Equilibrium in a stock mar-
ket economy with shareholder voting; Working Paper No. 1217, Fac-
ulty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British
Columbia.
SARGENT, T. and N. WALLACE (1975) : Rational expectations, the optimal
monetary instrument and the optimal money supply rule; Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 83, pp. 241-254.
SILBER, W.L. (1981) : Innovation, competition and new contract design in
futures markets; Journal of Futures Markets, vol. 1, pp. 123-155.
SMALE, S. (19S1) : Global analysis and economics; in: K.J. Arrow and M.D.
Intriligator (eds.): Handbook of Mathematical Economics, vol. 1,
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
STAHL, D.O. (19S5) : Bankruptcies in temporary equilibrium forward mar-
kets with and without institutional restrictions; Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 52, pp. 459-471.
STAHL, D.O. ( 1985) : Relaxing the sure-solvency conditions in temporary
equilibrium models; Journal of Economic Theory, October 1985.
107
STIGLITZ, J.E. (1974) : On the irrelevance of the corporate financial policy;
American Economic Review, vol. 64, pp. 851-866.
STIGLITZ, J.E. (19S2) : The inefficiency of stock market equilibrium; Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 49, pp. 241-261.
TOBIN, J. (1980) : Asset accumulation and economic activity; (Jahnsson Lec-
tures), University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
WERNER, J. (1985) : Equilibrium in economies with incomplete financial mar-
kets; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 36, pp. 110-119.
WERNER, J. (1987) : Structure of financial marketes and real indeterminacy
•
- of equilibria; forthcoming, Journal of Mathematical Economics.
WERNER, J. (19S9) : Equilibrium with incomplete markets without ordered
preferences; Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 49, No. 2, Dec. 1989,
pp. 379-382.
WINTER, R.A. (19S1) : Majority choice and the objective function of the firm
under uncertainty: note; Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 12, pp.
335-337.
YOUNES, Y. (19SS) : Equilibrium with incomplete markets and differential
participation; Working Paper.
ZAME, W. (1988) : Asymptotic behaviour of asset markets I: Asymptotic
Efficiency; Discussion Paper A-220, Univerity of Bonn.
ZAME, W. (1989) : Efficiency and default; Working Paper, Department of
Economics, UCLA.
108


HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
I Bound -To-Plran
N MANCHESTER
INDIANA 46962

